University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1999

A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity
Kermit Roosevelt III
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons,
Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Roosevelt, Kermit III, "A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity" (1999).
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 801.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/801

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing:
The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity
KERMIT ROOSEVELT

III'

I. INTRODUCTION

The question of retroactivity is what to do when the law changes.
More precisely, it is to whom the new law should be applied, and to whom
the old. There are different answers to the question of differing degrees of
plausibility. Some are quite old and others fairly new. But lurking behind
the various instances ofthe question and its proposed solutions is a distinct
intellectual difficulty, which 1 will call the problem of retroactivity. The
question is a fairly narrow doctrinal issue: what rules should govern transitions between legal regimes? The problem is broader, and more jurisprudential. It is that the question has proved so hard to answer, that our
jurisprudence has lurched from one solution to the next. This Article is
not going to answer the question; it is going to solve the problem.
Law changes in two primary ways: via legislative and judicial action.
Clearly a new statute changes the law. Legislative retroactivity has proved
somewhat difficult to identify, 1 but the rules that govern it are fairly well
established. Legislation is presumptively treated as non-retroactive, but it
may, subject to certain limitations imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause,
operate retroactively if the legislature so desires. 2
* Senior Research Scholar. Yale Law School, Resident Fellow, Information Society Project.
A.B. Hanard I 993. JD. Yale 1997. I thank Beth Apse/, Chris Kut::., and Stephen F. Williams for
helpjid advice and comments. Bruce Ackerman deserves special gratitude for contributions to both
the Article and its subject matter. Faults are mine.
I. The difficulty lies in identifying, or stipulating. what counts as a "retroactive" effect. Courts
have distinguished between "primary" and "secondary" retroactivity, of which the former alters the
pas/legal effect of past conduct, and the latter only thejzaure legal effect of past conduct. See Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Commentators have
attacked the entire concept of retroactive effect as inherently confused. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch,
Rerroacriviry and Legal Change.· An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1069 (1997);
see generally Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 .. 31 ( 1977) (discussing
the faults and strengths of various theories of retroactive law).
2 . See Landgraf v. U.S. I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). A competing line of cases, now
disfavored. applied new statutory law to actions predating the enactment of the statute. See Bradley v.
1075
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Judicial retroactivity is far more complicated. Judicial decisions operate on several different kinds of law: common law, statutes, and the Constitution. The differing positive sources of the law being changed impart a
different character to each type of decision. At one end of the spectrum lie
judicial interpretations of statutes. The judicial decisions are evidence of
what the law is, but they are not, except in a purely predictive sense, the
law. The law is the statute; take it away, and the judicial decisions lose
their force. Since an unchanging 3 statute backs the judicial interpretations,
it makes sense to say that while decisions may change, the law remains the
same. An overruled decision is simply wrong; it is not and was never the
law. Consequently, retroactivity in statutory interpretation is not very difficult. The new, correct decision is applied to everyone. 4
At the other end of the spectrum is the common law. Once it was believed that the common law had a positive source independent of judicial
decisions, but this view has no modern adherents . Instead, it is now recognized that the positive source of the common law is just the judicial
decisions in which it is embodied. With no positive source independent of
judicial decisions, the law must change as the decisions change. Consequently, it makes sense to distinguish between old law and new law.
When law changes, there is a real question as to when it does so, and there
are real questions about to whom the new law should be applied .
Occupying the middle ground, and serving as the focus for this Article, is constitutional law. An analysis that works in terms of positive
source is difficult, since the origin of constitutional law proves surprisingly hard to identify Constitutional law has a positive source-the hallowed document-independent of judicial decisions. But the view that the
Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has serious
difficulties. This is not to say that it does not have redoubtable defenders,5
nor that, as a normative theory of interpretation , it is unattractive. The
School Bd . of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 ( 1974): Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham , 393 U.S
268, 281 ( 1969) ; United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S (I Cranch) I 03 ( 180 I) . Landgraf made
a heroic, although not entirely convincing, attempt to rationali ze the tre atment of retroa ctive
legisl ation without abandoning these cases. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-79.
3. While statutes are obv iou sly unchanging from a certain perspective (if not amended, their
words remain constant), they may actuall y direc t different results at different times as the surroundin g
legal context changes. For instance, a statute that conditions on a conviction for a crime ''o f moral
turpitude" might well have been triggered by a broader range of co nduct in 185 0 than it would be
today.
4. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991 ): cf Davi s v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333 , 346-47 (1974) (holding that co llateral relief is available if a new deci sion
establishes that a prisoner was convi cted "for an act that the law docs not make criminal ")
5. For example, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See. e.g., Ameri ca n Truckin g Ass·ns v.
Smith , 496 U.S . 167, 201 ( 1989) (Scal ia, J .. concu rrin g) (stating that "the Constitution do es not
change from year to year").
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difficulty is rather that it is hard to keep a straight face while suggesting
that the current panoply of substantive and procedural rights has always
existed, or, to take a less controversial example, that the First Amendment
has always embodied its current congeries of doctrines and distinctions. 6
The idea of an unchanging Constitution, as a descriptive matter, is a poor
fit with the realities of doctrinal evolution. Functionally, constitutional
law more closely resembles common law than statutory interpretation.
These types of law lie, as I have been saying, along a spectrum. Some
statutes have gaps, like the meaning of "restraint of trade" in the Sherman
Act, 7 that are large enough that courts filling them in are essentially engaging in common lawmaking. 8 But there is no principled difference between gap-filling and interpretation. An approach to the question of retroactivity based on positive source, then, can explain judicial behavior in
some cases, but it will not help to decide the hard questions. Nor, as will
be seen later, is this type of metaphysical analysis especially useful in resolving the practical difficulties raised by adjudicative retroactivity.
In fact, there may be no analysis that satisfactorily answers the question of retroactivity. This is because the question has been posed in the
wrong way, lodged in an analytic framework that sets up insuperable difficulties. The purpose of this Article is to shatter that framework and in so
doing to dissolve the difficulties, but shattering and dissolution are a ways
down the road. The first task, the concern of Part II, is to articulate the
question as it has been posed and to examine the attempts of the Supreme
Comi and its academic auxiliaries to answer it. Part III then attempts to
reveal the conceptual apparatus that drives us to that way of posing it, and
to propose an alternative way ofthinking.
Though it pauses at times to engage in theoretical analysis, this Article
at heart tells a story. Stripped to its essentials, the story chronicles four
different legal regimes. First, in the old days of the common law, judicial
lawmaking was understood as law-finding. 9 Following the lead of William Blackstone, judges conceived of the common law as existing independent of judicial decisions, a timeless constant that judges struggled to
discern. To put it in terms of the discussion above, all judicial lawmaking
partook of the theoretical structure of statutory interpretation, and when
later judicial decisions reached results incompatible with earlier ones, this
was not viewed as a change in the law. Consequently, questions of retro6. For an insightful analysis of the evolution of First Amendment doctrine, see David Yassky,
Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699 (1991 ).
7. 15 U S.C.§ I (1994).
8. But cf RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JURJSPRUDENCE 289 ( 1990) (rebutting the
view that the Sherman Act delegates common law authority to courts).
9. See infra Part ll.A.l

..
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act1v1ty were easy, indeed, invisible. New judicial rules, seen as more
accurate statements of the law, were applied to the parties before the court
regardless of when the transaction being litigated took place. Because the
law itself did not change, there was no sense in which the decision s operated retroactively.
The second era 10 opened with the Supreme Court's decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 11 Erie rejected the idea that judicial decisions
were merely evidence of an unchanging common law ; instead , it recognized that the common law was nothing more than those deci s ions . Consequently, a decision reaching a new result made new law, and the question of retroactivity appeared for the first time: Should the new law be
applied to transactions that took place before the date of the law-changing
decision? During this second era, courts answered the question affirmatively, basing decisions on the law in force at the time the decisions were
rendered, regardless of what the law might have been at the time of the
transaction being litigated. This practice has some intuitive appeal. A
new rule will presumably be adopted because it is thought superior to the
old one, and the reasons why it is superior will often-though not always-apply to the parties before the court. 12 The jurisprudence of thi s
second regime reflects an awareness of retroactivity and of prospectivity
(the technique of applying new rules only to cases arising after the new
rules are announced). 13 But because the general approach was still for
courts to apply the law in effect at the time they rendered decisions, there
was no need to ask whether a decision operated retroactively in the sense
of changing what the law was in the past.
This approach, which I will call "the decision-time model" was the
hallmark of the second regime . The third era starts with the Warren
Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 14 and it marks a radical break
from the past in terms of both the results reached and, more significantly,
the analytical approach. 15 Linkletter abandoned the second regime's principle that courts should apply the law in effect at the time they render their
decisions. Instead , it started from the premise that parties should be gov-

l 0. See infra Part II.A.2.
II. 304 U S. 64 (I 938).
12. If the new rule is thou ght substantivel y more fa ir (because, for example , it imposes th e

"correct" standard of care on a landowner), the value of fairn ess will usually be prom oted by ap plying
the new rule to the parties before the co urt. If th e new ruie is thought better beca use it increases
predictability, however, the value of predictability will seldom be served by ap plicati on to parti es wh o
expected their conduct to be governed by a different rule .
13. See infra Part ll .A.2.
14. 381 U.S.618(1965).
15 . Seeinfra PartliA.3.
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erned by the law in effect at the time ojtheir actions. 16 This premise is the
hallmark of what I will call "the transaction-time model." This approach
made it easier to employ prospectivity, which was undoubtedly a main
purpose of the theoretical switch. However, it complicated the effort to
obtain the results that formerly were reached simply by applying current
law. 17 For if the result dictated by current law is to be reached despite the
fact that the appropriate law is the law in effect at the time of the transaction, the law-changing decision must reach back in time to change what
the law was. The Warren Court's switch from the decision-time to the
transaction-time model is the birth of modern retroactivity jurisprudence.
The fourth regime 18 is the history of attempts to cope with the Warren
Court's legacy. As later sections will show, the transaction-time model
bequeathed us by the Warren Court is prey to insuperable theoretical difficulties. Modem jurisprudence has with great difficulty made its way back
to the principle that new law should generally govern parties regardless of
when the transaction being litigated took place. But it has done so within
the transaction-time model; it has done so by asserting that ever-broader
categories of decisions are to be applied retroactively. Consequently, it
has not freed itself from the difficulties that attended the Warren Court's
jurisprudence, and the current law of retroactivity is widely regarded as
intellectually unsatisfactory . This is terribly ironic, for what has happened
is that the concept of retroactivity has assumed greater prominence as part
of an attempt to solve a problem that was created by the introduction of
that very concept.
This Article was inspired by the recognition of that irony, but it does
not aim simply to point out the humor in our predicament. It offers the
possibility of solving the problem of retroactivity by returning to the jurisprudence of the second regime. This is a simple point, but a convincing
presentation of it requires not only recounting the history of retroactivity
jurisprudence but also developing an appropriate perspective from which
to view it. Without the theory, the story is all but pointless; without the
story, the theory is numbingly abstruse and esoteric. The Article tries to
weave the two together, but even this introduction is no doubt rendered a
bit cryptic by the lack of theoretical ground-laying. The next section thus
undertakes a necessary exposition of the analytical framework and introduces a bit of useful vocabulary; then, the real story will begin.

16. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part lll.A . l.
18. See infra Part ll.B .
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THE QU ESTION OF RETROACTIVITY

Consider a transaction between two parties occurring at Time 1 and a
lawsuit filed immediately thereafter. Under the settled law at Time 1,
Party A will prevail (the "transaction-time result") . At Time 2, the Supreme Court hands down a law-changing deci s ion ; under the new law,
Party B will prevail (the "decision-time result"). 19 At Time 3, the lawsuit
comes before the Court.20
It is clear that there are two possible outcomes. Either Party A win s,
or Party B does : The Court will reach either the transaction-time or th e
decision-time result. What determines the outcome? Although the Court
has recently characterized the issue as one of temporal "choice of laws," 2 1
the actual analysis it performs bears no obvious resemblance to any currently popular approach to choice of law. 22 It starts from the premise that
parties should be judged by the law in effect at the time of their actions
("transaction-time law")_l' The question is thus not what law is to be applied but rather what the transaction-time law is. If the decision-tim e result is to be reached , it must be because decision-time law has become

19. The questi on of whether the court ap pli es the new rul e to the parti es befo re it in th e Time 2
case is certainl y rel evant, and at times has been held dispositive. See. e.g. , Harper v. Virg in ia Dep' t of
Tax ation, 509 U.S. 86, 97-99 ( 1993). Oth er cases have gi ve n it no we ight. See, e.g . Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-02 (1 967). This iss ue will feature prominentl y later; in th e in te rests of
smooth exposition , I postpone the disc uss ion .
20 . I postpone consideration of th e furth er compli cati on of whether the case is presen ted on direct
or coll ateral revie w.
2 1. James B. Beam Distillin g Co . v. Geo rgia, 501 U S. 529, 53 5 (1 99 1).
22. Earlier retro activity anal ys is inquired whether the purpose of the new rule would be serv ed by
its application in the case before th e Court. See. e.g., Chev ron Oil Co. v. Huso n, 404 U.S 97, 106
( 197 1); Linkletter v. Walker, 38 1 U S. 6 18, 628 (1 965). This bears some sim ilari ty to Brainerd
Curri e's governmental interest anal ys is of choice-of-l aw questions. See ge nerally LEA BRJL MAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 47-59 ( 1995). The current approach , focusing on ri ghts parties hold at the time of
their actio ns, resembles most cl osely the "ves ted ri ghts" theo ry championed by Jose ph Beal e and
popul ar in the earl y twentieth centu ry. See id at 20-25. Beale' s appro ac h is now th oroughl y
discredited , see id. at 25-41 , which makes it a less th an encouraging starting po int fo r mode rn
retroactivity juris prudence.
23. Thi s principle is not se lt~ev id e nt (indeed , I will argue later that it is wro ng), but it has st rong
in tuiti ve appeal, partic ularl y in the criminal context. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKI NG RJG HTS
SERI OUSLY 85 (rev . ed . 1978) (" We all agree th at it would be wron g to sacrifi ce the rig hts of an
in nocent man in th e name of some new duty created afte r the even t."). The Sup rem e Co urt also
adopts it. See, e.g., Slova/1, 388 U.S. at 296 (focusing on th e date of conduct). So, too, di d Joseph
Beale ; indeed, the prin cipl e th at judges do no more than decl are rights th at vested at the time of the
relevant trans ac ti on was cen tr al to hi s co nflicts theory. See. e.g, 1 JOSEPH BEALE, CONfLICT Of
LAWS 38 ( 1935 ) ("[l]f th e judge makes th e law he declares, then th e law di d not exist at the
commiss ion of the alleged wron g ... and th e de fe ndant is hel d for a wrong whi ch was no t a wrong at
th e time he did it. This is contrary to all co ncepti ons of justice."). Beale, unl ike Dworkin and th e
Supreme Court, relied on Swifl v. Tyson, 41 U S. ( 16 Pet.) I ( 1842) fo r thi s ciaim . See id at 39 ("(AJ
di ffe rence of opinion betwee n the state co urt and th e federal co urt sitti ng in th e state as to the Jaw of
th e state ... is quite in compatibl e with th e court maki ng the law.")
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transaction-time law, i.e. , because the new law is effective retroactively. 24
The Court thus has two options. It may apply the Time 2 decision
retroactively, thereby changing the law in effect at Time 1. This approach
reaches the decision-time result although nominally applying transactiontime law : Party B wins .25 The second possible technique is to announce
that the Time 2 decision is to have only prospective effect. The new rule
will apply only to cases filed after the date of the Time 2 decision. The
law changes at Time 2/ 6 but the "old" Time 1 law will govern cases filed
before then: Party A wins. 27
This model of retroactivity analysis is what I have called the "transaction-time model." One of its consequences, which will tum out to be an
Achilles heel of sorts, bears mentioning. Suppose the Court reaches th e
first of the two above dispositions and applies the Time 2 decision retroactively . This approach changes the law in effect at Time 1. The result is
that a case finally decided between Time 1 and Time 2 is rendered incorrect. The retroactive application of new law injects error into proceedings
that were error-free when conducted.
This consequence is a significant source of the difficulties attending
the question of retroactivity. The question itself, however, is simply
phrased: How should the Court make the decision between prospective
and retroactive application? It is a hard question, and it has inspired much
clever and innovative sch olarship. More importantly, it is the wrong
question. It is a question that cannot be answered and that never should
have been asked. It exists, I will argue, only because of the Warren
Court's misunderstanding of earlier decisions, and it implies a theoretical
framework that is unworkable in principle and in practice .

A Th e Historical Origins of Retroactivity: Th e Question Raised
The question of retroactivity seems one of obvious importance. Whatever we think of Holmes ' famous dictum / 8 the life of the common law has
certainly been change . Changes in judge-made law demand that the courts
oversee transition between the legal regimes. It might be expected, then ,
that at common law there would be at least some recognition of the diffi24. To a certain extent, thi s idea of a fairness-bas ed requirement of transacti on-time law has bee n
constitutionali zed as a prohibition on ex post fact o legislati on. See U. S. CONST. art. 1. §§ 9, 10.
25 . For an exampl e of this approac h. see Griffi th v. Ken tudy, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1 987).
26. Co nsistency with th e Co urt 's co mmit ment to transacti on-time law would re quire th at the law
change at the time of the tr ansaction. giving ri se to the Time 2 lawsuit. The Co urt has. howeve r.
alw ays treated th e date of th e deci sion as dispositi ve. See Linkl etter v. Walker, 38 1 U.S 6 18. 639
( 1965).

27. For an exampl e of thi s approac h, see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U.S. 97, I 05-09 ( 1971 ).
28. OLI VER WENDELL HOLMES, JR , TH E C0!\·1MON LAW I ( 188 1) (''The li fe of the law has not
bee n lo gic. it has been ex peri ence." )

-
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cult issues created by adjudicative retroactivity. Significantly, this is not
so. The case most often cited as the first example of retroactivity jurisprudence, United States v. The Schooner Peggy/ 9 features legislative, not adjudicative, retroactivity, and it disposes of the issue with the truism that a
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. (The
law at issue in The Schooner Peggy specified that it was to have retroactive effect, and the Court applied it. Modem courts, in exempting preenactment transactions from the scope of statutes that do not so specify,
are of course also applying the law in effect at the time of their decisions;
the law is interpreted not to reach those transactions.)
Before the Warren Court, the question of retroactivity was not found
in the case law, for the simple reason that the concept of retroactivity was
not there either. As the following sections discuss, the concept had no
application according to the dominant nineteenth-century understanding of
the common law. A functional retroactivity-analytically quite distinct
from the current version-arose as that understanding eroded, and it was
this idea that was appropriated by the Warren Court and pressed into
service for a task to which it was not suited.
I. The Blackstonian lvfodel

The concept of retroactivity is a relative newcomer to our jurisprudence. In 1910, Justice Holmes could write, "Judicial deci s ions have had
retrospective operation for near a thousand years." 30 While Holmes was
right in terms of result, his description was theoretically sli ghtly off. The
nineteenth century's received understanding of the judicia l role was encapsulated in Blackstone's adage that judges are " not del egated to pronounce a new law, but to mai ntain and expound the old one." 31 On this
declaratory theory, judicial common law decisions reflected, but did not
embody, the law. The result ofthis conception of law was that a change in
a court's ruling implied " not that the law is changed, but that it was always
the same as expounded by the later decision, and that the former decision
was not, and never had been, the law, and is overruled for that very reason ." 32
This understanding of the nature of law wili, of course, produce the
uniformly retroactive result to which Holmes adverted. That result is not,

29 . 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) .
30. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co .. 215 U.S 349,372 (1910) (Ho lmes, J. , dissenting).
31. 1 WILLIAM BLt\C KSTONE, COMMENTARI ES *69-70 ( 1765-69).
32. Gel peke v. Cit y of Dubuque , 68 US (I Wall.) 175. 211 {1863) (Miller, J. , disse nting) . See
Harry Shulm an, Retroactive Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TH E SOCI.Al. SCIENCES 355 , 356 (Alvin
John so n & Edwin R.A . Seligman eds. , !934) (describin g overruling deci sions as not "new law but an
ap plication of what is, and th ere tofore had been , the tru e law").
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however, correctly characterized as retrospective application of changed
law. Instead, the Blackstonian model takes law as a timeless constant,
always (optimistically) assuming the correctness of the current decision.
Prior inconsistent deci si ons are and a lways were incorrect. 33 The consequence of this idea of law as an apotheosized immutable is that the concept of retroactivity has no place; "old law" and "new law" are necessarily
the same.
Changes in law could occur via legislation, of course, and this at least
provided a chance for the question of retroactivity to raise its head. Doctrinally, however, prospectivity was not even nascent; the concept of retroactivity was simply not di scussed. 34 In the 1801 case of The Schooner
Peggy, Justice Marshall had stated flatly that "if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of an appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its
obligation denied. " 35 The Schooner Peggy dealt with the effect of legislative changes. The treaty at is sue specified that it was to have retroactive
effect and pres umably, Marshall would similarly have followed a law dictating that it was to be applied only to post-enactment transactions. The
Schooner Peggy simply instructs courts to apply the law in effect at the
time of their dec isions, and this principle had no serious challengers until
the twentieth century. 36
2. Intimations of Prospectivity

The Blackstonian mode l, in its full metaphysical glory, is somethin g
of a legal unicorn. Its transcendently brooding common law does not exist
now, and never rea ll y did, although it there are still rare reported
sightings 37 and s ides how s imulacra. 38 It is acceptable within a unifi ed ju33. The difference between a Blackstonian model and retroactive appli cation of new law is th at
retroactive ap pli cati on changes th e law (and does so only so far back as th e decis io n is ap pli ed
retroactively).
Thi s is a fine di stinction. and unpleasan tl y metaph ys ical. but such are the
conseque nces of the Blackston ian ac coun t.
34. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 6 18, 622 -24 ( 1965).
35. United Statt:s v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U S. (I Cra nch) 103 , Ill ( 180 I)
36. Some early cas es seem to treat legislat ion as presumptivel y non-retroactive , creatin g a tension
with the Bradley-Th orp e line of cases discussed supra note 2. See Chi cago, Indi anapo lis, &
Loui sv ille Ry. Co . v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 567 (1913) (refusing to address question of possible
preemption of state statute by post-transacti on fede ral legislati on) . Howeve r, as an interpretive
pres umpti on, this approa ch does not really contlict with The Schooner Peggy's adm onition to app ly
the law 111 effect at th e time of the decisi on; it simply suggests that, absent evidence to the contrary.
· th e law will be read as though it directed courts not to app ly it to pre-enactment transacti on s.
37. In particular. Blackston ian vis ions periodicall y visit Justi ce Scalia. See supra note 5: see also
ANTONIC: SCALI A, A M,\TTER OF INTERPRET ATION 40 (1997). Of co urse, Justic e Scalia is no t a
Blackstoni an with respect to comm on Jaw. and it is onl y the pervasive willi ngness to brin g a w mmon
law perspect ive to constitutional in terp retati on that makes his originalism in that endeavor appea r
Blackstoni an.

-
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dicial system , but the existence of two sets of independent tribunals expounding the same law tests it severely .
Such was the case with respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of state
and federal courts under Swift v. Tyson 39 in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries .40 While federal courts deferred to state courts on matters of
statutory interpretation, "where private rights are to be determined by the
application of common law rules alone, [the Supreme Court], although
entertaining for state tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound by
their decisions." 41 Swift sounded a Blackstonian theme, stating that decisions of courts "are, at most, evidence of what the laws are and are not, of
themselves, laws," 42 and went on to affirm that state court decisions " cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own
judgments are to be bound up and governed." 43 The existence of distinct
and overlapping state and federal common law created obvious difficulties
for parties structuring transactions, but it followed from the idea of a transcendent common law of which judicial decisions were only reflections .
The fact that settled state court constructions of state statutes were
authoritative made things easier for private parties but somewhat more
difficult for metaphysicians. The binding effect of settled state court interpretations made them functionally quite similar to "real" law, but a
Blackstonian federal judge might still believe that state court decisions
were, in some sense, wrong. It was in this context that portents of the
question of retroactivity first appeared. 44
In a series of cases dealing with defaults on municipal bonds, the
Court declined to follow post-transaction state court decisions on state

3S. Ronald Dworkin, as discussed infra tex t accompanying notes 171-81 , embraces a
Blackstonian ac co unt as part of his attempt to distinguish himself from positivists. Unlike Justice
Scali a, he doe s extend thi s approach to common law.
39 . 41U S (J 6 Pet)l(J 842).
40 . Formally , th e rcgim ~ di scussed below survived until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp kins. 304 U.S.
64 ( 1938 ) Howeve r, the doc trine was moribund substantiall y earlier. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co , 2 15 U. S. 349, 3 7 1 ( 191 0) (Holmes, J. , di ssenting).
41. Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Bl ack) 418 , 428-29 ( 1862).
42 . S wift, 41 U.S at 5. It may be useful at this point to di stinguish between two senses of the
"made" vs. ·'frJllnd" distin cti on. In one se nse, as a realist/Biackstonian debate, the questi on is wh eth er
law ex ists independ ent of judicial de cisions. It is in thi s sense th at Swift deni es that judges make law,
and endo rses a pos ition th at has almost no modern adherents. See Rich ard H. Fal! on, Jr. & Dani el J.
Meltze r, NeH• La w, Non-Re!roaclivily, and Conslilutional Remedies, 104 H A RV. L REV. 1731 , 1759
( 199 1). In the oth er sense, a natural law/positivi sm debate , both sides acce pt th at judi cial dec isions
are law; the ques ti on is the de gree of constraint on the decisionmakin g process . If th e first deb ate is
dead. th e second is deadly; thi s Article will avoid it as misguided, inconclusive, and unproductiv e.
43. S wift, 41 US. at 19.
44. Portents onl y. As I argue below, th e foll owing cases feature spurious non-retroacti vity,
fun ctionall y ident ica l to th e real thin g but analyticall y di stin ct.
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statutory issues. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 45 the first in the series, is illustrative. In 1857, the city of Dubuque issued bonds in support of two local
railroads. 46 Between 1853 and 1859, the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly
upheld the statute authorizing the issuance against challenges und er the
Iowa Constitution. 47 In 1859, however, it reversed itself.
That settled the issue, presumably, for the Iowa courts: the statute was
uncon st itutional ab initio and the bonds were no good. But what of th e
overlapping system of federal jurisdiction? How should federal courts
treat the constitutionality of the statute with respect to bonds (like Dubuque's) issued before the Iowa court's reversal?
If a question can be imagined, it will usually be litigated , and this one
proved no exception. Bondholders sued Dubuque in federal court for
failing to pay coupons on the 1857 bonds . The city defended on the
grounds that the statute was unconstitutional and the issuance of the bonds
ultra vires and void. 48 The question for the Supreme Court was whether it
was bound by a state supreme court decision handed down after the relevant transaction. 49
The Court answered no. Since federal courts were ordinarily bound by
state co urt statutory interpretations, the effect of the Gelpcke decision was
to refuse retroactive effect to the Iowa Supreme Court's holding of unconstitutionality. Burgess v. Seligman 50 and Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. 51
similarly refused to be bound by post-transaction state suprem e court decisions. Both Burgess and Kuhn , however, featured questions of state law
unsettled at the time of the transaction rather than state court reversals.
We might read these decisions as working within the tran sacti on -time
model set out above and denying retroactive effect to a change in law .
Justice Holmes' dissent in Kuhn took precisely this perspective, arguing
that the " fiction " of Swift v. Tyson 52 had been abandoned, that " dec isions
of state courts of last resort make law for the state," and hence that "a
change of judicial decision after a contract has been made on the fa ith of
an earlier one the other way is a change of the law." 53 Holmes characterized Gelpcke and other municipal bond cases as resting " not on th e
45 . 6SUS( 1Wa11)!75( 1863).
46. See id at 177-78 .
47. See id at 179-87.
48. See id at 179.
49 . See id at 179-80.
50. 107 U.S . 20 (1883).
5i. 215 U.S . 349 (1910). At iss ue in Kuhn was not statutory interpretati on but common law. The
Co urt. howevt:r, co nced ed that a settled pattern of state court dec isions of the issue would create a
·'ruic of property" with the binding effect of statutory interpretati ons. See id at 360.
52. 4 1 U.S ( 16 Pet.) I ( 1842), overruled by Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938)
53. ld at 371 (Holmes. J. disse nting) .
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grounds that this court agreed with the first decision , but on the ground
that the state decision made law for the state, and therefore should be
given only a prospective operation when contracts had been entered into
under the law as earlier declared." 54 Because Kuhn dealt with unsettled
law, Holmes argued that the state court decision should be authoritati ve
and retroactive. " I know of no authority in this court to say that, 111 general, state court decisions shall make law only for the future.""
Holmes, as usual, was slightly ahead of his time . Although he had
only to wait for the assertion of that authority, it was not being exercised
by hi s colleagues . The Gelpcke Court wavers in its characterization of its
reasoning. In some places it suggests that it refuses to follow the latest
Iowa decision because it should be prospective: "However we may regard
the late case in Iowa as affecting the future , it can have no effect upon the
past. " 56 In others it suggests that the later decision is wrong: "The earlier
decisions, we think, are sustained by reason and authority." 57 Burgess and
Kuhn are somewhat clearer. Those Courts refuse to be bound by intervening state deci sions not because the decisions are prospective only but
because they are not authoritative, and the decisions are not authoritative
because of the independence of the federal judiciary from state decisions
not representing settled rules. 58 This independence relies on the Swift idea
that decisions are not law but merely evidence of it. In Burgess, notably,
the state court decisions arose out of the same transaction being litigated in
federal court; the state courts had thu s declared the law governing that
very transaction. ' 9 The Court's decision was driven by its understa nding
54. ld
55. ld at 372.
56. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) I75, 206 (1 863 ). lfwe tah: e this remark to be refe rring
to th e effect of the deci sion on what th e law was, then it so unds like an asse rtion of pros pectivity: if
we understana it as referring to what th e federal court is bound by. it tits more neatly within a
Bl ackstonian model. Th e latter is th e better readin g; the Court claims that whil e the Iowa
interpretation mi ght in th e future beco me auth orit ativ e over federal courts (by attaining, throu gh
repetiti on, the status of settled adjudi cati on), it is not now . Interestingly, Justice Scali a, wh o merits
th e tepidly contested di stinction of bein g th e greatest Ji vin g constitution al Blackstonian. was to ech(>
the Ge lp cke Court in his concurrence in American Tru cking Ass 'ns v. Smith , 496 U.S . I 67, 2 02-0~
( 1990) (Scalia, J , concurring). See infra notes 155-57 and accompan ying text. justi ce O ' Co nnor.
who does not ri val him in this res pect, tri ed a simil ar tack with less success in James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 I U.S 529. 55 0-52 (I 99 I) (O 'Conn or. J.. disse ntin g). See infra note 27 I.
57. Gelpcke is a multi faceted case with co nstituti onai ove n ones: argu ab ly, fo ll owin g the last Iowa
court deci sion and voiding the bonds would have vi olated the federal constitution by impairing
contracts valid when formed. (There is. of course. th e facile response that if the dec isic1n is
retroacti ve, the contracts were not valid wh en form ed. an argument th at has succeed ed at least on ce.
See Tid al Oil Co. v. Fl anagan , 263 U.S. 444 ( 1924)) .
5S. See Burgess v. Se li gman. I 07 US 20. 32-34 ( ! 883 )
59. See id at 35. The image of fed eral co urts ignorin g the pronoun ce ments of state co ur1s as to
state law governing th e precise tran sacti ons being liti gated in federal court is striking. Th e proof that
th ose wh o do not lea rn fr om history are doo med to repeat it came when the same scene was re-enacted
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not of "old law" or "new law," but of "true law." 60 The question it sought
to answer was not "What was the governing law at the time of this transaction?" but simply "What is the governing law?"
The fact that federal courts were bound only by settled state court decisional rules allowed for functional prospectivity. Until a state court 's
changed interpretation represented a settled rule, federal courts could disregard it, even for post-decision transactions. But the issue was clearly
one of authority, not of retroactivity. 61 It was not until fifty years later that
Burgess, Kuhn, and Gelpcke would be seen through the lens of retroactivity jurisprudence-and then they would not be seen well.

3. The Birth of (Non) retroactivity: The Warren Court's Mistake
The strong Blackstonian position of Swift v. Tyson, that judicial decisions were merely evidence of an independent and unchanging common
law, appears implausible to the modern eye . It was not much more popular with even its near contemporaries. 62 With the recognition that courts
make law came the possibility of prospective overruling. Academics had
begun to discuss the idea by the turn of the century, 63 and in the 1932 case
of Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., the Supreme Court approved the practice as constitutionally legitimate in state

within the feder al judici al system under Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S . 293 ( 1967). See infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
60. See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co, 3 11 U.S. 53 8, 540-41 & nn .9-1 0 ( 1941)
(describing Burgess and Kuhn as relying on federal independence rather than non-retroactivity) .
61 . Indeed , Celpcke's most memorabl e lines are a ringing, if ove rhe ated. affirmati on of federal
independence : " We shall nev er imm olate truth. justice, and the law because a State tribunal has
erected the altar and de creed th e sac rifice .·· Celpcke. 68 U.S. at 206-07.
62. See, e.g, W.J. Adams, Jr. . Comtilutional Law-Proteclion of Rights Acquired in Reliance on
Overruled Decision, II N.C. L. REv. 323, 329 ( 1933) (characterizing th e Blackston ian acco unt as
''antiqu ated dogma and useless fiction'') ; Charles E. Carpenter, Decisions and the Common Law. 17
COLUM. L. REV 593 ( 19 17) (arguing that co urts make law). The Carpenter article is interes tin g as an
early example of the trans action-time model. Carpenter argues for the prin ciple that parties should b~
gove rn.:d by th e law in effect at the tim e of th eir actions , which he identifies with the doctrine th at
co urts make law. See id at 604 ("If the decisions of the co urts make the law, the over-rulin g dec ision
need have no retroactive operati on beyond that involved in the de cision itse lf, because the over-ruling
decision merely chan ges the law from the tim e it is made and leaves the law prior to that tim e
unch anged."). But thi s is a too-fac ile ass imilation of judi cial to legislative chan ges in law . For one
thing, it takes the apparently inco herent position (later ad op ted by th e Supreme Court in Linkletter v.
Walker, 38 1 U.S. 618.639 (1965)) that appl ying transacti on -time law requires the cou rt to loo k to th e
latest decision iss ued at the time of the trans action. The obv ious problem with this procedure is th at if
the law-changing deci sion is ap plying transacti on-time law (retro ac tively altered or not), th e changed
law is held effective as of the date of that transaction . Thus, the relevant dates are dates of
transactions, not decisions.
63 . See Bery l Lev y, Realist Jurisprude nce and Prospective Overruling, I 09 U. PA. L. REV. I , 7- 8
( 1960) (attributing the first sc holarl y end orsement of pros pecti ve overruling to a 19 17 speech by
George F. Canfi eld and noting that state co urts had empl oyed the technique even as early as the latenineteenth century).
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courts. 64 Characterizing the Blackstonian account as "ancient dogma,"
Justice Cardozo wrote, "A state in defining the limits of adherence to
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relation back. It may say that decisions of its highest
court, though later overruled, are law nonetheless for intermediate transactions."65
Well before Erie, in other words, the spirit of the law had begun to slip
into the body of judicial decisions. With the Erie decision, Swift v. Tyson
was explicitly overruled and the incarnation was complete. The common
law thus descended from the heavens was plainly mortal. As courts overruled themselves, Jaw could change; law could die. With the possibility of
law-changing decisions, the false unity of the Blackstonian model dissolved. Transaction-time and decision-time law became recognizable as
clearly distinct entities.
Because the practice under the Blackstonian understanding was to give
automatic effect to later statements of the law, the principle of simply applying decision-time law had a significant advantage . Already enshrined
in Marshall ' s The Schooner Peggy opinion , it quickly extended its reach to
law-changing decisions. If the operative rule is simply to apply current
law, the concept of retroactivity has no role to play, and Supreme Court
decisions through the 1940s, relying heavily on The Schooner Peggy, applied decision-time law without discussion in cases where changes were
wrought by intervening legislation 66 or decisions. 67 Vandenbark v. OwensIllin ois Glass Co 68 explicitly repudiated Burgess and Kuhn, holding that
federal courts "should conform their orders to the state law as of the time
of the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus cause the reversal of judgments which were correct when entered."69 Vandenbark
clearly follows The Schooner Peggy in dictating that current law be applied. Like The Schooner Peggy, however, it holds out the possibility of
64. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). It has bee n argued th at Sun burst does not s peak to pros pectivity of
co nstituti onal decisi o ns.
See James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Co urt

Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1062, 1065-66 (1984) . Levy sugges ts that Cardozo 's interest in
prospectiv ity stemmed from a retroact iv e in crease in co urse requirem en ts that Columbi a Law School
had imposed whil e Cardozo was a stud ent. Refus in g to submit. he nev er rece ived a law degree. See
Lev y, supra note 63, at I 0 n.31.
65. Sunburst, 287 U.S . at 363.
66. See. e.g., Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U. S. 23 (1940) . Carpenter, lik e Th e Schooner
Peggy, is best understoo d as standing for dec ision -t ime law rather th an decis ion-time re sult. The
stat ute at issue explicitl y provided fo r applica ti on to cases " now ... pe ndin g in an y co urt of the
United S tate s." !d. at 27 .
67. See, e.g, Vandenbark v. Owens-Illino is Glass Co. 3 11 U.S. 538 ( 1940 ).
68. ld
69. Jd at 543 .
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prospective results. If a state court ruled that its decis ion should be applied only prospectively, as Sunburst had held it might, Vandenbark would
presumably require federal courts to follow this prescription.
Although the concept of prospectivity had been considered by the Supreme Court in 1932, it took substantially longer for the transaction-time
model to w in a place in its opinions. There were flickers of prospectivity
in the 1950s/0 but it was not until the late 1960s that these sparks found
tinder. It was then that the Court found a need to engage in prospective
overruling; it was then that the question of retroactivity truly emerged.
The Warren Court 's revolutionary changes in criminal procedure produced an eq ually revolutionary change in retroactivity analysis. The Warren Court's first sustained discussion of retroactivity came in Linkletter v.
Walker. 71 That case posed the question of retroactive application of Mapp
v. Ohio, 72 which had held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to the States.73 The rule announced in Mapp had been applied in that
case, and to cases pending on direct review at the time of the Mapp decision. 74 The issue for the Linkletter Court was thus whether the Mapp rule
could be invoked on habeas petitions by plaintiffs whose convictions had
become final before the Mapp decision .75
The Court began with a historical discuss ion of the Blackstonian
model and its erosion. It attributed to Austin a rival conception of law on
which "judges do in fact do something more than discover law; they make
it interstiti ally." 76 Locating the Austinian model in cases such as Gelpcke
70. See. e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J , concurring); Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 ,275 (1951) (Black, J , dissenting) .
71. 38 1 U.S 618 (1965). In England v. Louisiana Sta te Board oj:'vfedical Examiners , 37 5 U.S .
411 ( 1964). the Co urt had , wi thou t co mment, refused to apply its holding to th e parties be fore it.
Althou gh Linkletter re li ed on England for the proposition that there was no Article Ill barrier to pure
prospectivity , England offe rs only an inference from silence. Th e Linkletter Court' s carefully phrased
refere nce to England, " [N]o doubt was expressed of our powe r und er Article III ," Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S 618,622 n.3 (1965), is tellingly precise : nothing was express ed at aiL
72. 367 U .S. 643 (196 1).
73. See id at 657.
74 . See, e.g, Ker v. State ofCalifomia, 374 U.S. 23 (1964).
75 . The question of how the Warren Cou rt' s new rul es would app ly to habe as petitioners had not
gone unnoticed . See. e.g, Pau l M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 , 527 n.220 (19 63) (noting the "baffl ing problem" of habe as
and retroactivity) .
76. Linkletter, 381 U. S. at 623 -2 4. Oddly, the Court concluded that on th e Austin ian model ,
earlier decision s that are overrul ed were wrongly decided . This co nclusi on follow s directly from the
Blackstonian model , and in fact the Austinian view allows one to avo id it by invoking th e co ncept of
changed law . Cj Paul J. Mishkin, Fore word The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
ofTime and Law, 79 H ARV . L. REV. 56, 58 (1965) (stating that after be gi nning with Blackstone , ·'the
opini on co untcre d~ so m ew hat unconventionall y- w ith A ustin " ). The Co urt approached the idea th at
earlier decisi o ns were correct when de cided by characteri z ing th em as ''existing juridical fact[s ] until
ov erruled," which produces the same result. Linkletter, 38 i US at 624.
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and Sunburst, it argued that earlier decisions were not erased by later overrulings . From this doctrine and other cases, including The Schooner
Peggy and Vandenbark, it derived the propositions "(1) that a change in
law will be given effect while a case is on direct review ... and (2) that
the effect of the subsequent ruling of invalidity on prior final judgments
when collaterally attacked is subject to no set 'principle of absolute retroactive invalidity ' but depends upon a consideration [of fairness and policy]."77 "[I]n appropriate cases," it concluded, "the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective." 78
To decide whether the rule should be applied prospectively, the Court
created a three-factor test of purpose, reliance, and effect. Because the
purpose of the Mapp rule was not to exclude unconstitutionally obtained
evidence but to deter unconstitutional searches, retroactive application of
Mapp to habeas petitions would not further the purpose of the rule. This
fact, coupled with the States' reliance on the earlier Woifrule and the devastating (from the States' perspective) effect of application of Mapp to
habeas petitions, led the Court to conclude that non-retroactivity was the
sounder course.
The Linkletter analysis is deeply unsatisfying . First, it seriously misreads Gelpcke, Kuhn, and Vandenbark; consequently, it draws upon a historical tradition that does not exist 79 Second, it blithely assumes that Sunburst can be applied to federal courts despite the federal prohibition on
advisory opinions. 80 Most significantly, it draws a distinction between
cases on direct review and those in which a judgment is collaterally attacked that is simply impossible to justify within its own theoretical
model. 81 Linkletter's petition (and Justice Black's dissent) made the obvious argument that the search in his case had occurred after the search in
77. Linkleller, 381 U.S. at 627.
78. ld at 628.
79. Those cases are concerned with authority, not retroactivity--except to the ex tent that
Vandenbark embodies the principle that courts must app ly current law. Linkleller may also misread
Sunburst. See Haddad, supra note 64, at I 063-64.
80. Sunburst dealt with prospectivity in state courts, which are ofte n permitted to iss ue advisory
opinions . Whether a prospective decision is ad visory was thus not add ressed.
81 In fact, the Cou rt made no real attempt to justify it. The opinion discusses the general
tendenc y against prospectivity , notes some cases that apparentl y suggest prospectivity is permissible,
and mysterious ly conc ludes that ·' under our cases'' the two catego ries arc to be treated differently.
Linkleller, 381 U.S. at 627. Of course, no case mentioned in Linkletter had even discussed
diffe rentiating between direct co llateral review~though to be fair , this is quite likely a consequence
o f the fact that the cases had not had to deal with mu ch co llateral review. The Linkle tter Cou rt, by
co ntrast, found itself near the high-water mark of federal habeas corp us review of state judgments.
See, e.g, Fay v. Noia, 3 72 U S. 391 (1963), overruled by Wainwri gh t v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977).
But the problem rem a ins: simpl y characterizing intermediate deci s ions as "ex isting juridical fact[s]
until ove rrul ed" doe s not explain why the effects of th e ir existence sho uld depend on th e procedural
posture of a case. Linkletter, 38 1 U.S. at 624 .
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Afapp 82 The application of the Mapp rule to Mapp herself implied that, at
the time of that search , the exclusionary rule applied to the States. Thus it
would seem that it must necessarily have applied at the time of the later
search in LinkletterY But even granting that the date of the Mapp decision
is the relevant law-changing moment, the Court ' s approach is incoherent.
Its oddity has provoked substantial commentary, 84 but it bears repeating. Con sider two defendants implicated by evidence seized in a single
inv alid search. 85 They are tried separately; both proceed to judgment at the
same time . But while one judgment becomes final , the defendant in the
other case avails himself of a lengthy appellate review, which is still ongoing when Mapp is decided. When the defendants seek relief on the basis of Mapp, the result will depend simply on whether or not the conviction has become final : the habeas petitioner will be told that there was no
error in the conduct of his trial, and the defendant whose case comes on
direct review will reap the benefit of Mapp. The evidence is inadmissible
as to on e but not as to the other, though it is fruit of the same search and
may, indeed, be the same evidence.
The Linkletter result was almost inevitable. Allowing habeas petitioners to benefit from the Mapp rule would have produced an avalanche of
habeas petitions and new trials. The burden on state criminal justice systems wo uld have been intolerable; apart from the administrative cost of
ne\v trial s, the states would have been forced to reassemble evidence and
\vitnesses for cases whose original trials were now years in the past. 86 But
the rationale, or lack thereof, provoked fierce criticism. 87 Clearly, retroactivity jurisprudence could not rest where Linkletter had placed it.

82. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 641-42 (Black, J., dissentin g).
83. The Co urt dealt with this contention by di sagreeing: "The date of the seizure in Mapp has no
legal sig nifi cance It was th e j ud gment of thi s Co urt that changed the rule , and the date of that
opinion is the crucial date. In th e light of th e cases of this Co urt, this is the better cutoff time'' !d. at
639. The Co urt th en cited The Schooner Peggy, putting an odd twi st on a cry ptic argument.
84 . Se e, e. g, Francis X Bcytagh, Ten Years of No n-Retroactivity. A Critique and a Proposal, 61
VA. L. R EV. 1557, 1565-66 (1 975); Thomas S. Currier, Tim e and Change in Judge-Alade La w
Prospe c1ive Overruling, 51 VA. L REv. 20 I, 20 1-04 ( 1965); James B. Haddad, " Retroactivity Sh ould
be Rethought.· " A Call fo r the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRJ M. L & CRIMI NOLOG Y 41 7
( 1969); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity. Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Prof essor Mishkin,
33 U. CH I. L RE v . 7 19, 764 (1 966)
85. A more extensive ··melodrama" based on thi s hypotheti cal is offered by Curri er. See Currier,
supra note 84, at 201-04.
86. Se e Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S . 667 , 69 1 (1971 ) (Harl an, J , concurring) .
87. See so urces cited supra note 84. Even Paul Mishkin , sympathetic to th e Linkleller res ult,
fa ui ted th e Court for its cry pti c anal ysis and unnecessary abandonm ent of th e Blackstoni an
dec laratory mode l. Discuss ing the sy mboli c value of the declaratory theory, Mishkin commented, " If
the view be in part a myth , it is a myth by which we live and which can be sacrificed only at
sub stanti al cost." Mishkin , supra note 76, at 62-63
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B. Modern Retroactivity Jurisprudence: The Question Confronted
1. Criminal Procedure

Unable to distinguish between habeas petitions and direct review, yet
unwilling to allow uniform retroactive application of new constitutional
rules, the Court in Stovall v. Denno 88 moved in the opposite direction.
New rules had to be applied in the cases in which they were announced,
lest constitutional adjudications "stand as mere dictum," 89 but their application to other cases, those on direct review and those presented on habeas
petitions alike, would be judged by Linkletter's purpose-reliance-effect
triad. 90 Employing these factors, Stovall held that the new rule requiring
the presence of counsel at exhibitions of accused parties to identifying
witnesses would be applied only in the case in which it was announced.
"Selective prospectivity" was born.
The Stovall regime of selective prospectivity achieved the goal of unifying the treatment of direct and collateral review, but it was a Pyrrhic
victory. Selective prospectivity compounded the problems of the Linkletter approach. Linkletter's line between direct and collateral review had
drawn a distinction without a difference, but selective prospectivity created differences without distinctions. The application of a rule to one defendant but not another, who might have participated in the same crime
and been tried separately, was not merely unfair but openly incoherent
when both cases came to the Court in the same procedural posture. If new
law governed one case, for whatever reasons, it should govern the other,
for precisely the same reasons. Legally correct results do not become incorrect by reason of iteration. 91 The Stovall Court's justification for selective prospectivity, adherence to "sound policies of decision-making," 92 is
somewhat ironic in the face of Stovall's results. 93 By refusing to apply in a
88. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
89. ld at 301. On th e transaction-time model , the concern is real, si nce the court is not declaring
the rights of the parties before it but rather announcing how future cases will be decided.
90. See id at 300. Under Stovall, resu lts turned no longer on finality but rather on whether th e
conduct in question had occurred before or after the law-changing decision .
91. If the fact of announcing a new rule is a relevant factor in the Co urt 's decisi onmaking process,
this may not be true. For a suggestion that the Court 's function of norm-promul gation sho uld be
primary, see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 19 78 Term-Foreword· The Forms of Justice, 93
HARY. L. REv. I (1979) . Subsequent applications of new rules do not have the virtue of being
vehicles for norm-promul gation . Individual litigants, however, certainly have a claim to sec justice
done on the merits of their individual cases , and it is true that this concepti on of justice requires
co nsi stency.
92. Stovall, 388 U.S . at 301.
93. One particularly unfortunate result of the new law/o ld law dichotomy was the consequent
impli cation that the new rule was not the best reading of precedent but rather a legislative-style
change effected by the will of the Court. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S 667. 70 1 (1967)
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subsequent case the law it had announced governed the particular transaction at issue, Stovall achieved the all-but-impossible task of reproducing
within the federal system the peculiar inconsistency that Swift v. Tyson had
permitted between state and federal courts.
Although the Linkletter/Stovall regime survived well past the Warren
Court, support was not unanimous even in its heyday. It was initially
backed both by Justices who saw in non-retroactivity a means to implement desired reforms without inflicting unacceptable disruption on the
criminal justice system and by those who disagreed with the reforms and
accepted non-retroactivity as a way to limit their effect. The diverse bases
for support reflected the underlying tensions in the doctrine. While selective prospectivity was hard to accept in theory, full retroactivity was impossible in practice. Yet distinguishing between cases on direct review
and those presented by habeas petitions had proved impossible to do in a
principled way within the transaction-time model. 94
In a series of concurrences and dissents beginning in 1969, 95 Justice
Harlan made a sustained attempt to craft a principled doctrine. He began
with the premise that the Court's duty was to decide cases according to its
best understanding of the law. 96 It followed that selective prospectivity
was unacceptable. "Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate
review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards,
and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this
model of judicial review." 97 New constitutional rules must therefore be
applied to all cases on direct review. 98
Habeas petitions presented different issues. Much as the Warren
Court had in refusing to apply retroactively its expansions of the exclusionary rule, Justice Harlan looked to the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus as applied by the Warren Court. 99 Finding it to serve a similar de-

(Harian. J., dissenting) ("[T]he retroactivity doctrine announced today bespeaks more considerations
of policy than of legal principle."); Mishkin, supra note 76, at 65 ("'ndeed, the conscious
confrontation of the question of an effective date ... smacks of the legislative process."). The Warren
Court's new rules thus took on a more starkly legislative cast. The Court's non-retroactive results
suggested this legislative aspect, but it was not necessary to enshrine it in the theory.
94. See Stovall. 388 U.S. at 300.
95. See Williams, 40 I U.S. at 70 I; Elkanich v United States, 40 I U.S. 667 ( 1971) (Harlan, J ,
concurring); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, l, concurring); Desist v United
States. 394 U.S. 244,256 (1969) (Harlan, l, dissenting).
96. See Williams, 401 US at 677-80; Desisl, 394 US at 258-59.
97. Williams. 401 US. at 679.
98. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.
99. Justice Harlan addressed the Warren Court's conception of habeas corpus out of necessity,
since his views that it "constitute[ d] an indefensible departure both from the historical principles
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terrent function, "as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards," 100 he similarly concluded
that application of decision-time law was not necessary to its purpose.
Justice Harlan thus concluded that with few exceptions, the law applied on habeas petitions should be the law in effect at the time of the initial trial. 101 His view of the scope of the required exceptions changed
slightly over time . Initially, he proposed that '" new' constitutional rules
which significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to
be retroactively applied on habeas," since one of the purposes of the habeas writ was to "assure that no man has been convicted under a procedure
which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted."102 This excepti on was later abandoned in favor of a class defined
by reference to the category of procedures " implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ." 103 Justice Harlan ' s second exception was for rules " that
place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe . . .. " 104
Reaching a different result in cases on direct review and those before
the Court on petition s for habeas corpus was obviously attractive, as it
would allow the Court to abandon the embarrass ing doctrine of selective
prospectivity without causing prison do ors to swing too wide. Ju sti ce
Harlan's distinction, however, had more to do with his different conce ption of habeas corpus than a new theory of retroactivity: " As regards cases
coming here on collateral review, the problem of retroactivity is in truth
none other than one of resettling the limits of the reach of the Great Writ,
which under the recent decisions of this Court has been given alm ost
boundless sweep." 105 He recommended different treatment simply in order
to respect the finality of prior adjudications. 106 This reliance on finality did
not provide a principl ed distinction easy to incorporate into the exi st ing

whi ch defined the sco pe of the ' Great Writ ' and from the principles of federali sm whi ch have formed
the bedrock of our constituti onal devel opment," had not prevail ed. Jd at 262.
100. Jd at 262-63. The parall els between the treatm en t of habe as petiti ons and th at of the
ex clusionary rule are strikin g. See Butler v. McKell ar. 494 U.S . 407, 414 ( 1990); Penry v. Lynaugh.
492 U.S. 302,351 (198 9) (Scali a, J , concurring).
101. See Desist, 394 U. S. at 263.
I 02. /d. at 262.
103. Palko v. Conn ec ti cut, 302 U.S. 3 19 , 325 ( 193 7). Justi ce Harlan' s example of thi s so rt of
procedure was the ri ght to coun sel es tab li shed in Gide on v. Wainwrighl, 3 72 U S 33 5 ( 1963 ).
104. Willi ams v. United States, 40 1 US. 667 . 692 (1 97 1) (Harl an. J , di ssenti ng) .
105. Jd at 701-02.
I 06. See id at 690.
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jurisprudence of retroactivity.' 07
Though not perfect, Justice Harlan's approach was more attractive
than the selective prospectivity of Stovall, and it exerted a gravitational
pull. After Desist, the Court's attempt to differentiate habeas petitions
from direct review followed a tortured path towards Justice Harlan's results. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 108 Justice White suggested in a
footnote that the impact of retroactive application to habeas cases might
be mitigated by the fact that defense lawyers were unlikely to make objections obviously futile under settled law: "The States, if they wish,
may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and
valid rule that failure to object ... is a waiver of any claim of error." 109
This idea received qualified endorsement in Engle v. Isaac, 110 a case in
which the Court rejected the argument that novelty excused a procedural
default that would otherwise bar the raising of a claim on a habeas petition.'"
The Hankerson-Engle approach offered a clever, if heartless, method
of effectively denying retroactive relief to habeas petitioners. 112 Its ultimate efficacy was never tested, however, because majority support
emerged for the more direct approach advocated by Justice Harlan. In the
1987 case of Griffith v. Kentucky, 113 the Court abandoned the LinkletterStovall analysis and accepted Justice Harlan's argument that "new rules"
of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively to all cases pending on
direct review. 114 Two years later, in Teague v. Lane, 115 the Court adopted
Justice Harlan's approach to collateral attack as well: "Unless they fall

I 07. The most significant problem with a reliance on finality is that the finality interest is always
present in a collateral attack. Finality, by itself, offers no reason to distinguish between challenges
relying on old law and those urging the application of new law. See infra Part !!I.A.
108. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
109. Jd at 244 n.8 (citation omitted).
II 0. 456 U.S. I 07 ( J 982).
J J J. See id. at J30-3 J. The Engle Court reserved judgment on the question of whether novelty
could ever establish cause for failure to object, reasoning that the grounds for the objection were
available to petitioners at the time of trial.
112. The Hankerson-Engle approach was not without its critics. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now
announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themseives of it
waived their rights.'').
113. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The progress towards Griffith was also a gradual one. See Shea v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985) (applying Johnson to new Fifth Amendment rules); United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (limiting non-retroactivity on direct review to new rules constituting
"clear breaks" with precedent).
114. Although the Griffith Court quoted Justice Harlan's opinions with approval, it followed him at
the level of result rather than th?.t of theoretical model. See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying
text.
115. 489US288(1989).
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within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced." 116
For all its claimed fidelity, the Teague opinion departed from Justice
Harlan's vision in two respects. First, it modified his suggested exceptions
to the general rule. While adopting wholesale the principle that changes in
law should be applied if they placed "primary private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," 117 it
combined the two versions of the second exception he had proposed in
Desist and Mackey. New rules would be applied only if they both required
observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
contributed to the accuracy of the verdict. The Court suggested that the
intersection ofthese categories would be extremely narrow. 118
The second departure from the Harlan model was more significant.
The Teague Court stated that recognition of the new rule urged by the petitioner would require its application to his case, lest "constitutional adjudications ... stand as mere dictum." 119 Yet the restrictions it had previously set forth would preclude application in other habeas cases. Since
selective prospectivity "hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration
of justice with an even hand, "' 120 the Court concluded that the best practice
was to "refuse to announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule
would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and to all others
similarly situated." 121
This reasoning was entirely consistent with Justice Harlan's position .
Teague's difference lies in its conception of newness. 122 Because Justice
Harlan adhered to a model of adjudication on which "many, though not all,
of this Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental
principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year,
but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds
generation," 123 he saw a relatively small class of cases as announcing rules
sufficiently new to bar application on habeas petitions. The current Court,

116. /dat310.
!!7. ld at 311 (citation omitted).
118. Indeed, since Teague, no such rule has been discovered. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL ..
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDER..'\L SYSTEM 1409 (4th ed. !996)
!19. Teague, 489 U.S at 315 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967))
120. !d. (quoting Desist v United States, 394 U.S. 244,255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
121. /d.at316.
122. See id at 301 (stating that ··a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent").
123. ld at 263.
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by contrast, has embraced a very broad conception of new law. 124 The
current retroactivity jurisprudence in criminal law has thus moved towards
bright-line rules-retroactivity on direct but not collateral review-and
away from the underdetennined Linkletter balancing. Its distinction between direct and collateral review, and its consistent focus on transactiontime law, however, brand it as Linkletter's intellectual descendant and,
more significantly, as a product of the transaction-time model. 125
2. Statutes of Limitations
The retroactivity jurisprudence developed in the criminal context did
not carry over to civil actions of its own force. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 126 however, the Court adopted an approach very similar to the Linkletter analysis. Chevron arose from a personal injury suit under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 127 When the case was filed, circuit precedent
held that admiralty law, including the equitable doctrine of laches, applied
to such claims. While pretrial discovery was underway in the district
court, however, the Supreme Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., 128 holding that state statutes of limitations were to be absorbed and applied as federal law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. 129 Under the Lousiana one-year statute of limitations for personal
injury suits, Huson's suit was time-barred two years before it was filed,
and the district court accordingly granted summary judgment against
him. 130
The Supreme Court disagreed. Citing its criminal law precedents as
well as a number of civil non-retroactivity cases, it set forth a three-factor
test related to the Linkletter analysis. The first element was a threshold
determination that the decision to be applied non-retroactively "estab124. See. e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); see generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note
42, at 1748 (stating that "(t]he conception of legal newness implicit in Teague and its progeny is
difficult to reconcile with the conception of the judicial role embraced by Justice Harlan"). The
current Court's broad conception of new law may be understood in part as an attempt to limit the
reach of habeas petitions. It is also, I believe, a consequence in part of the dominance of the
transaction-time model. Because this model suggests that judicial lawmaking is akin to legislative
lawmaking, it makes even incremental changes in law appear discretionary innovations rather than
logical extensions of precedent. While this conception may have the desired result of reducing the
scope of habeas, it undermines the legitimacy of judicial review.
125. The markers of the transaction-time model are Griffith's insistence on applying new law
retroactively-in order to change the law that governed at the time of the transaction-and Teague's
admission that finality is the best justification that can be offered for differential treatment of direct
and collateral review. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
126. 404US97(1971)
127. 43 us c.~~ 1331-1356.
128. 395 U.S. 352 (1970)
129. See id at 355 (referring to 43 U.S.C ~~ 1331-1356)
130. See Chevron, 404 U.S at 99.
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lish(ed] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent ..
. or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed. " 13 1 The second factor absorbed the Linkletter criteria, condensing them into an analysis of the purpose of the new rule . The
third was a balancing of equities. 132
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the Rodrigue rule
should not be applied retroactively. The Rodrigue decision had overruled
clear circuit precede nt; the purpose of the rule was to aid injured employees like Huson ; and holding Huson to have "s lept on his rights" when he
could not have known that state law applied would be inequitable. 133
The three-factor Chevron test sprang from the same principles animating the Linkletter analysis. The similarity between criminal and civil
contexts was not surprising; Linkletter had drawn upon civil precedents
and stated that historically " no distinction was drawn between civil and
crimina! litigati on .... " 134 Notwithstanding Linkletter's observation, this
uniformity did not persist. In 1987, the Court decided Griffith v. Kentucky,
and automatic retroactivity became the rule for criminal cases on direct
review, while Chevron was relegated to the civil arena. 135
As late as 1987, Chevron was employed to prevent retroactive appli cation of a decisi on altering the statute of limitations, in Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji. 136 By 1991, the tide of retroactivity, however, was
rising. In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 137 the
Court retroactive ly applied its adoption of a federal statute of limitati ons
for suits unde r Rule I Ob-5 138 of the Securities Exchange Act 139 with no
mention of either Chevron or non-retroactivity. Justices Stevens and
Souter, dissenting, crit ic ized the majority for "undertak[ing] a law mak in g
task that should properly be performed by Congress" 140 and noted the diffi131. Jd at 106 (citations omi tted )
132. See id at 106-07.
133. See id at I 08 (citation om itted).
134. Linkl etter v. Walker. 38 1 US618,627( 1965).
135. See Griffith v. Kentuck y, 479 U.S. 3 14, 322 n.8 ( 1987) .
136. 481 U.S 604 (1987) . The Saini Francis plaintiff had filed his suit in 1980, and Third C ircuit
cases startin g in 1977 had held that a six-year statute of limitations (rather th an th e two-year
limitations period the Third Circuit ann oun ced in 1985) governed his claim. Interestingl y, one month
later the Court decided the appea l of the law-changing circuit court decision. The original complaint
in that case, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 US. 656 ( 1987), had been tiled in 1973 . Reason ing
that the law in 1973 was unsettl ed and the plaintiff cou ld not have relied on circuit precedent
establishing the six-year limitat ions period. the Court held th at th e new rule specifying the two-year
statute of limitati ons shoul d app ly. This created a sort of hopscotch retroactivity: The new rul e was
applied to the 1973 act ion, but the old one was applied to th e 1980 acti on.
137. 501 us 350 (199 1).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 ( 1998).
!39. 15 US.C.~78j(b)( l 99 4)
140. Lampj, 50 1 U.S at 366 (Steve ns. J.• dissenting).
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cult questions of retroactivity created by judicial decisions based on policy
determinations. 141 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, invoking Chevron and
Saint Francis, criticized the majority's silent disposition of the retroactivity question for both its disposition and its silence. 142
One plausible explanation for those features of the majority opinion,
as mentioned in Part I, is the positive source of the law being applied.
Lampf involved an interpretation of Section 1Ob-5, an unchanging
statute; 143 one might plausibly think that since the statute had not changed,
the law had not either, and the Court's decision therefore raised no retroactivity issues at all. This understanding of statutory interpretation would
avoid the pitfalls of the transaction-time model, by avoiding the question
of retroactivity entirely. But while positive source does affect the plausibility of characterizing overruling decisions as "changing the law," the
Court has never distinguished between statutory and constitutional adjudication,144 and its statute of limitation retroactivity decisions do work within
the transaction-time model.
Lampf is thus probably better understood as simply evidence of the
growmg influence of Griffith. There is, after all, no obvious reason to

141 See id at 367-68.
142. Like Saint Francis and Goodman. Lampfand its consequences have a story worth telling. Six
months after Lampf, Congress added Section 27 A to the Securities Exchange Act. Section 27 A(a)
overruled Lampffor cases pending when it was handed down; with respect to cases still in court. this
was clearly constitutionally acceptable. Section 27 A(b) went further, attempting to reinstate those of
the cases that had been dismissed as time-barred as a result of the Lampf decision. This latter section
spawned a cottage industry of commentary and bad puns. See. e.g, Patrick T. Murphy. Note, Section
27A of the SEA: An Unplugged Lampf Sheds No Constitutional Light, 78 MINN. L REV. 197, 211-12
(1993); Craig W. Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act.· Is
Congress Rubbing Lampf the Wrong Way?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1213. 1213 (1992); Anthony Michael
Sabino, A S!atutory Beacon or a Relighted LampP The Constitutional Crisis of the New Limitary
Period for Federal Securities Law Actions, 28 TULSA LJ. 23 , 61-64 (1 992). In Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm. Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). the Court struck down Section 27A(b) as an unconstitutional
infringement on the separation of powers, fulfilling in part Justice Kennedy's prediction. See Lampf,
50 I U.S at 379 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (stating that even congressional action would "not avail
defrauded investors caught by the Court's new and unforgiving rule"). The result of the Lampf-27 APlaut three-step was thus that litigants who, though time-barred under Lamp[, had managed to hang
on until the passage of27A had the sword lifted. But even that was not the end. Section 27A said
nothing about untiled cases, and in a final twist, investors defrauded before Lampf but who had not
filed suit at the time Lampf was decided had their claims subjected to the new. shorter limitations
period.
143. SeeLampf,SOI USat352.
144. Nor does positive source work very well as a policy justification: the reliance interests of
parties who put their trust in judicial opinions cannot be meaningfully distinguished based on whether
those opinions interpret statutes or the Constitution. This sort of metaphysical answer to a practical
problem is characteristic of some retroactivity scholarship, see infra notes 171-81 and accompanving
text, but its arid l~Jrmalism is quite unappealing. 1\s Part lll argues infra, there is a better way .
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distinguish between civil and criminal suits, 145 and the tension between
Chevron and Griffith was bound at some point to erupt into openly acknowledged conflict. Lampf clearly suggested that Chevron was in difficulty, and the tide of retroactivity overtopped the barrier between criminal
and civil cases in the succession of tax refund suits decided between 1989
and 1993.
3. Tax Refunds
It is a well-settled principle of law that a state must provide retrospective relief from an unlawful tax if it does not provide the taxpayers with a
meaningful opportunity for prepayment challenge. 146 This relief need not
take the form of a refund; if, for example, a tax violates the Equal Protection C la use, the state may remed y the violation by imposing additional
taxes retrospectively to equalize the discriminatory treatment. 147
Cases in which a tax is clearly unconstitutional when enacted thus
present no real issue of retroactivity: Purely prospective relief for coerced
payments is inadequate as a matter of due process . 14 8 The difficult question from the retroactivity perspective is what result obtains when a tax
was not clearly unconstitutional when enacted but became so as a result of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith 149 confronted, but did not resolve,
this question . The Smith plaintiffs challenged an Arkansas trucking tax as
a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 150 While the case was
pending, the Court decided American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Scheiner, 15 1
which held unconstitutional a similar Pennsylvania tax. 152 In Smith, Justice

145. But see American Trucking Ass ' ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 197-99 (1990) (sett ing forth
j ustifications for disparate treatment of criminal and civil cases). Justice O'Connor's attempt to
reconstruc the hi sto ry of retroactivity doc trine is valiant but ultim ately unpersuasive. Linkletter
clearly did not see the ditTcrences she posits; it does not draw the distinction and in fact denies it. See
Linkletter v Walker, 381 US. 6 18, 627 ( 1965). More se riously, Justice O'Connor's proposed
distincti on encounters serious diffi culties when the same law is implicated in both civil and criminal
co nte xts. Fallon and Meltzer offer the following exa mpl e: if a state brings both c ivil and cri minal
non payment actions against a delinquent taxpayer, and the tax is held unconstitutional by a decision
rendered v;hile the cases are on appeal , different results in the criminal and civi l sp heres will imply
that the tax was both co nstitutional and unconstitutional at the time of the nonpayment. See Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 42, at 1767-68. Thi s makes law rath er too much like quantum physics: a tax
statute is no Schroedinger' s cat.
i 46. See, e.g, McKesso n Corp . v. Di visio n of Alcoho li c Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22
(1990) : Ward v. Love County, 25 3 U.S 17,2 4 (19 20).
! 47. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U S 749, 755 ( 1995).
148 . See Harper v. Virginia Dep 't ofTaxatio n, 509 U S. 86 , I 0 I ( 1993)
149. 496 US. 167 (1990).
150. See id.
151. 483 U.S. 266 ( 1987)
!52. See id at 269.
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O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, m employed the Chevron threefactor analysis and concluded that Scheiner should not be applied to taxes
for highway use prior to the date of that decision. 154
Like the Stovall regime, the Smith approach drew support from very
different camps. While the plurality favored selective prospectivity and
sought to contain Griffith within the criminal sphere, Justice Scalia, who
provided the fifth vote for the non-retroactive resu lt in Smith, did so because he believed that the holding of unconstitutionality was incorrect. 155
This position bears an obvious similarity to Justice Harlan's early pragmatic tendency to accede in selective prospectivity out of a desire to limit
the effect of reforms he found unwise. Scalia's theoretical justification,
however, was a neo-Blackstonianism that most closely resembles the position of the Gelpcke Court. Conceding the authority of the Scheiner
opinion as a matter of stare decisis, he denied its correctness and refused
to be bound on pre-Scheiner questions. 156 The principle underlying this
position, the same as that driving the opinion in Gelpcke, is that while an
incorrect decision may compel a judge to acquiesce in a subsequent case ,
it does not change the true (prior) law. 157 For Justice Scalia, the res ult in
Smith turned on authority, not retroactivity; the questi on was to what extent he was bound to adhere to a deci sion with which he disagreed. 158
On the question of retroactivity, Justice Scalia, like the four
dissenters, 159 emphatically denied the propriety of. prospective decisionmaking. Thus while Justice O'Connor mu stered five votes in favor of a
se lectively prospective result, the th eoretical alignment was a five to four
split against prospectivity entirely. Where the plurality sought to cabin

153. The plurality was composed of Justices O'Connor, White, and Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
154. See Smith, 496 US. at 178-83 . The Court 's tr<:atment of retroactivity as a federal question
was inconsistent with Scheiner, which had remanded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a
co nsideratio n of retroactivity. See Scheiner, 48 3 U.S at 297 -98. The Pennsylvania court held that
Scheiner should be applied purely prospecti ve ly, and the taxpaye rs received onl y a pro-rated refund
fo r the year in which Scheiner was decirled. See American Trucking Ass ' ns v. McNulty, 596 A.2d
784, 790 (Pa 1991 ).
155. See Smith , 496 U.S. at 202-04 (Scalia. J.. concu rring).
156. See id at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 . Arg uabl y, if Scheiner had claimed to app ly its new rul e retroactively , it would have
constituted an authorit ative statemen t of transacti on-time law, binding Justice Scalia to a similar result
in Smith. The Scheiner Court, however, remanded for a consideration of retro act ivity , and th e
Pe nnsy lvania co urt held in favor of prospectivity . See supra note 154 .
158. See Smith, 496 U.S. at 204-05 (Scalia, J , concurring).
159. Compare American Trucking Ass 'ns v Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (Scalia. J. , concurring)
("[P]rospective dec isionmaking is incompatible with thejudicial role .... "), with id at 214 (Stevens.
L di sse nting) (" [A]dherence to legal principle requires that we determine the ri ghts of liti gants in
accordance with ou r best current understanding of the !aw.'' ).
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Griffith, the dissent urged its expansion. 160 Given the clear supp01t of Justice Scalia, there was no doubt that a majority of the Court was willing to
bring Griffith into the civil arena.
When the Court decided its next tax refund retroactivity case in 1991,
Justice Souter had replaced Justice Brennan. Any hopes this shift might
have kindled in foes of Griffith were swiftly dashed. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgid 61 produced five opinions, none of which commanded more than three votes. Majority trends were evident, however.
Six Justices rejected selective prospectivity, and three of those condemned
any sort of prospectivity at all. 162 Two years later, Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation 163 found five Justices explicitly extending Griffith's
mandate of equal treatment for similarly situated parties to civil cases, and
selective prospectivity was finally interred. 164

4. Summary
Given the complexity of the retroactivity jurisprudence, it is worth
pausing at this point to recapitulate at a slighter higher level of generality.
I have divided the analysis by subject matter in order to display the progress of the Court ' s reasoning in similar cases; the result of unifying the
picture may resemble the blind men's experience of the elephant. The
disparate narrative threads combine to form a somewhat tangled tapestry,
and the following summary may lack aesthetic uni ty. Life does not always
imitate art.
NonThe basic outlines, however, should be relatively clear.
retroactivity emerged in the criminal context with Linkletter v. Walker

160. See id at 214 (Stevens , 1.. disse nting).
16 1. 501 US. 529 (1991). Beam featured a fact pattern similar to Smith. A 1984 decision,
Bacchus Imports. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), had struck down a Hawaii tax as violating
the Commerce Clause. The Beam plaintiff so ught refunds for monies collected und er a very similar
Geo rgia tax . That th e tax was unconsti tuti onal was clear: Georgia had repealed it in 1985 . See Beam ,
501 U.S. at 532. The question was whether relief was available for pre-1984 taxes , i.e. , whet her
Bacchus was retroactiv ely effective . See id.
162. Justices Blackmun , Marshall , and Scalia railed against prospectivity . See Beam . 501 U.S. at
547 (Biackmun, J.. concu rring): id. at 548 (Scalia, J., co ncurring). Justi ce Souter. delivering the
opinion of the Court desp ite being joined onl y by Justice Stevens, reje cted se lec tive pro spectivity, and
stated that "GrUfi th cannot be confined to the criminal law." ld. at 540. Justice White al so co ncurred ,
rejecting selective pros pectivity but adding that he believed Griffith had been wrongly dec ided. See
id. at 545 (White, J., co ncurring).
163. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
164 . See id at 90. The continuing vitality of pure pros pectivity is highly questionab le. Justice
White, writing separate ly in Beam , criti cized Justice Souter's opinion for reserving the questi on and
th ereby suggesting doubts. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 546 . Pure prospectivity does retain the support of
at le ast three current Justi ces (O'Connor, Kennedy. and Rehnquist) . For reasons rel atin g to the
limitati ons of their the oretical approach, however, it seems unlikely that pure prospectiv ity will
resurface. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
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(1965). Stovall v. Denno ( 1967) provided for unified treatment of cases on
direct review and those presented by habeas petitions and permitted selective prospectivity. Chevron Oil v. Huson (1971) extended prospectivity
into the civil arena . Criminal law, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly
inhospitable to selective prospectivity, and Griffith v. Kentucky ( 1987)
rejected it. Teague v. Lane ( 1989), following Justice Harlan, announced
restrictive standards for the availability of retroactive relief to habeas petitioners.
Griffith proved impossible to contain within the criminal sphere, and
in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation ( 1993 ), the Court embraced
Griffith's mandate of equal treatment in civil cases as well: If a new rule is
applied in the decision that announces it, it must be applied in subsequent
cases on direct review. In consequence, retroactive results have reassumed
the primacy they enjoyed before the Warren Court's innovations. (The
most recent retroactivity decision, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,
breaks new ground only in its treatment of the remedies; it is discussed in
detail infra Part III.)
The end of all the Court's explorings has been to arrive, more or less,
where it started: "New" legal rules are applied to cases on direct review
but not to those presented collaterally. 165 But while the current Court
reaches much the same results as it would have before it embarked on its
non-retroactivity odyssey, there is a significant theoretical difference . The
concept of retroactivity has emerged , and the question of retroactivity
stands now as one of the knotty problems of our jurisprudence. lt is not
the Everest of legal theory, the central concern that the countermajoritarian
difficulty was for Bickel's generation of scholars, but it is a difficult subject that has attracted the attention of a number of talented and ambitious
legal thinkers. The next section considers the efforts of the academy to
answer the question of retroactivity.

165. Because th e avail ability of collateral revi ew used to be mu ch narrower, th e pre- Link/etter
tre atment of coll ateral review is rarely displ ayed. Chico/ County Dra inage Dis!. v. Bwa er State Bank,
303 U.S. 37 ! ( 1940), is the most illuminating pre-Warren Supreme Court de cision featuring a
collateral attack arguing for the application of new law, and it rej ects the argument because of th e
collateral nature of the ch allenge . See id. at 376-77 . Interestingly, co urts and commentators se<.:m to
think th at the hi storical approach would have been to decide collateral attacks bas ed on new law-th is
fear w a> , after all, what necessit ated Linkleller's "stron g readin g" of its precedents See. e.g ,
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 61 8, 628-29 n. l3 ( 196 5) (listin g Warren Court cases ap pl ying new law
to collateral att ac ks); Dani el J. Meador, Habeas Corp us and the "Retroactivity " Illusion, 50 V A. L.
REv . 1115, 111 6-20 (1964 ) (arguing for applicati on of new Jaw to habeas petitions) . Thus, th e irony
of th e Warren Co urt 's retroacti vit y juri sp ruden ce is that, as Part Ill demonstrates, not onl y was th e
cure worse than th e di sease, but there was no disease at all. Linkleller cre ate d th e ve ry proble m it
tri ed un successfull y to so lv e.
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C. Modern Retroactivity Scholarship: The Question Answered?
Academics show rare consensus in their estimation of the Court's performance: it is unsatisfactory. James Haddad laments that "doctrinal confusion and inconsistency are the hallmark of nonretroactivity jurisprudence."1 66 Jill E. Fisch comments that "the Supreme Court's recognition
of the intellectual poverty of its retroactivity analysis has led to efforts to
formulate a more rational analytical structure, albeit with limited
success." 167
The general dissatisfaction with the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence
has not produced a corresponding consensus on the appropriate alternative.
One scholar seems to think there is no problem; 168 others believe that the
question of retroactivity is best understood as a question of remedies; 169
still another suggests that retroactivity analysis should be guided by a
model of equilibrium drawn from physics. 170 The following sections take
up these attempts to answer the question .
I. Metaphysical Answers to Practical Questions

a. Ronald Dworkin 's Neo-Blackstonian Approach
Ronald Dworkin ' s critique of positivism provides a clear statement of
the principles underlying the transaction-time model : retroactive application of the law is unjust, and consequently the morally relevant rights and
duties are the ones existing (i.e., legally recognized) at the time of the
transaction. 171 He faults positivism precisely because it suggests that judicial decisions retroactively impose new duties, and his theory of adjudication is designed to do away with this unfairness. 172 Dworkin's positive
theory maintains that legal decisions enforce pre-existing rights, and that
right answers exist in almost all cases. 173 As a result, Dworkin sees judicial decisions as best readings of settled law conjoined with principles of
justice and endorses decision-time results as the correct statement of trans166. Haddad , supra note 64, at I 062 (citing Beytagh, supra note 84 , at 1558-96; John Bernard
Corr, Retroactivity.· A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied, " 6 1 N.C. L. REv. 745, 748-63
(1983))
167. Fisch, supra note I, at I 058.
168. See infra Part li.C.I
169. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 , at !733.
170. See Fisch , supra note I, at I 056.
17!. See DwORKIN, supra note 23, at 81-85.
172. See id at 8!-85 , 335; R. Lea Brilmayer, The Institutional and Empirical Basis of the Rights
Thesis, 11 GA. L. R EV. !173 , !!75-76 ( !977); Kenneth J. Kress , Legal Reasoning and Cohere nce
Theories : Dworkin 's Rights Thesis. Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REv.
369, 373-74 (!9 84)
! 73. See DwORKI N, supra note 23 , at 87, 279-80; see also RON ALD DWORKIN. A MATTER OF
PRI NCIPLE !19-45 ( ! 985); Kress , supra note 172. at 3 74 .
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action-time rights.
This unification of decision- and transaction-time law seems to do
away with the problem of retroactivity, just as the Blackston ian model did.
If a judicial decision is simply the best reading of the law, then it produces
not only the just but the legally correct answer, and there is no issue of
retroactively imposing new duties on parties before the court.
A first criticism of Dworkin ' s account is that metaphysical solutions
do not resolve practical problems. The key issue of retroactivity is one of
unfairness, not injustice . That is, the problem in applying decision-time
law is not so much that the morally relevant rights and duties are transaction-time, but that it is unfair to parties to judge them by law about which
they had no way of knowing. Dworkin's argument that an overruling decision is simply the best reading of pre-existing law may solve the metaphysical problem, but it is cold comfort for parties who relied on clear
precedent. 174
A second criticism is that just rules and just results may not always
coincide; the reasons that make a new legal rule right may not make that
rule's result right in the case before the court. The Warren Court's analysis of the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and its conclusion that retroactive application would not further the principles of justice animating the
rule's expansion , provide an example of such a case . For another instance
of rule/result mismatch , consider a situation in which lower courts have
regularly borrowed state statutes of limitation to govern an implied federal
right of action. When the question is argued before the Supreme Court,
the Court decides that a uniform federal statute of limitations will better
serve justice by promoting uniformity and predictability. 175 This reasoning
is quite convincing; what is harder to see is how uniformity and predictability are served by applying the new federal statute of limitations to
cases pending on direct review. Thus the answer that seems right as a
matter of theory may still work obvious injustice to the parties before the
court.
Both the preceding criticisms are external. They accept Dworkin' s
claim s about how his model works and then take issue with the results.
Both criticisms, further, are contestable. It is possible to argue that vindicating pre-existing rights and duties is morally paramount regardless of
wheth er parties can know wh at those duties are, and it is possible to argue
that a Dworkinian judge will never reach a rule that, if applied, fails to

174 . See Stephen R. Munzer, Right Answers. Preexisting Rights. and Fairness, 11 GA . L. REV .
105 5. 106 1-62 ( 1977). But see D WORK iN, supra note 23. at 335 -36 (rebutting Mun zer, not ing th at
fairness enters into decisional calculus).
175 . See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind , Prupi s & Peti grow v. Gilbertso n, 501 U.S. 350, 36 1-62 (1 99 1).
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produce justice in the case before him .
There exists a third criticism, however, which is internal to Dworkin ' s
theory and more obviously devastating in its effect. It has been developed
at length by Kenneth Kress, 176 and I recapitulate the argument only briefly.
What Kress 's argument shows is that even within Dworkin ' s theory, judicial decisionmaking can produce results that differ between transaction
and decision time . Dworkin's analysis fails to take into account the extent
to which intervening decisions, by changing the settled law, can alter the
calculus that judges perform.
The point is as follows. Dworkin advocates a sort of coherentist
analysis, asking which result shows the body of preexisting law in its best
light. 177 That analysis reveals the rights the parties held at the time of their
actions, and it is those rights the court must vindicate. This would be well
and good if litigation were instantaneous. But it is not; between a transaction and its judicial resolution, many other judicial decisions may intervene. These change the preexisting law, but they cannot be ignored-they
are, after all, right answers. Since the body of preexisting law changes
with intervening decisions, it seems clear that an intervening decisioneven one not directly on point 178--can change the result in a pending
case. 179 In short, "legal rights depend upon the temporal order in which
cases are decided." 180 Thus decision-time and transaction-time law are not
necessarily the same on Dworkin ' s model: Depending on which cases are
decided between the transaction and its legal resolutio n, the " correct"
result may vary . And thus the Dworkinian approach does not provide even
a metaphysical solution. 18 1
b. The Answer from Positive Source
What I have said about the influence of pos itive source on our intuitive understandings of retroactivity might suggest that a happy resolution

176. See Kres s, supra note 172, at 369.
177. See RONALD DWORKIN , LAW'S EMPIRE 225-7 5 ( 1986).
178. Dworkin has lesser problems with intervening dec isions th at are directly on po int , since their
results, as best readi ngs, are presumably also co rre ct for later cases.
179. This must be the case unless all possible legal decisi ons can be derived from the body of
settl ed law existing at any parti cular time. Dworkin does not urge this hyperformali st proposition,
and with good reason: since reliance interes ts count in his calculus of justi ce, the existence of a legal
rule as part of th e settled law will have effects quite different from th ose of its existence in some
metaph ys ical heaven of "right answers"
180. Kress, supra note I 72, at 3 72.
18 1. The works of Dworkin that l cite are not centrall y co ncerned with retroacti vi ty, and it may
seem a bit unfair to take him to ta'k for problems with his answer to a qu es ti on he does not ask. But
the prob lems are not tangenti al: they unrave l his accou nt of adjudicative leg itimacy. Furthermore,
insofar as it is the retroacti ve element o f positivist adjudi cati on with whi ch Dworkin find s fault,
retroacti vity is a prime co ncern of his juri sp rudential theory .
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would be to determine retroactive effect by reference to the positive source
of the changed law. Thus new statutory interpretations would be given
retroactive effect in all cases, and new common law rules in none. Constitutional decisions, of course, would be harder, but perhaps they could be
identified as either best readings of existing precedent or discretionary
changes of the law, and given retroactive effect in the former but not the
latter case. This is, I think, the soundest metaphysical approach; that it
does not appear to have been suggested by any scholar is perhaps a testament to the academy's sound pragmatic instincts.182
A moment's reflection should show that this is no solution at all.
First, the statutory/co mmon law distinction bears no relation to any of the
factors that are appropriately weighed in a retroactivity balancing test such
as Linkletter's purpose-reliance-effect triad. (This is not to say that such
balancing tests are a good solution, only that distinctions unrelated to the
standard concerns of fairness and efficiencyl 83 are worse .) Second, the
solution with respect to constitutional Jaw is unworkable . The distinction
between "best readings" and discretionary "judicial legislation" turns in
part on questions of legal philosophy such as whether principles are part of
the law; as a result, di sagreement will present itself at a level of philosophical generality not conducive to the creation of stable, consistent doctrine.1 84 This clash of jurisprudential philosophies is precisely the evil to
be avoided. If some judicial deci sions appear unpleasantly legislative, that
is a problem of judicial philosophy, not of retroactivity, 185 and the question
of what lavv to apply cannot be reso lved at the philosophical level.
2. Remedial Analysis: Fallon and Meltzer

Professors Fallon and Meltzer have recently suggested that retroactivity issues are best analyzed within the law of remedies. 186 The conclusion
of this Article will be that remedial analysis is the only acceptable route to
prospective results, and in this respect Fallon and Meltzer are clearly correct. Moreover, their gene ral impul se-to dispense with high theory in
favor of practical analysis-is refreshing and welcome. Yet the move to

182 . Indeed. Fallon and Me ltzer specificall y (and correctly) characterize the jurisprudential debate
over wheth er new law is made or found as a waste of tim e. See Fallon & l'vle ltzer. supra note 42, at
1764.
183. Fisch identifies th ese as the leading prud ential factors, see Fisch , supra note 1, at 1084-91,
which seems correct, although she also seems to conflate utilit ar ian ism with fairness. See id at 108586.
! 84 . See Fall on & Meltze r, supra note 42, at 1762 .
185 . See Shea v. Loui siana, 470 U S 51 , 62 ( 1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("[C]oncems about the
supposed usurpatio n of legislative authority by this Court genera ll y go more to the substance of the
Co urt' s de cisions than to whether or not th ey are retroactive .") .
186. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 , at 1743.
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pragmatism occurs a bit too early. Fallon and Meltzer do not investigate
the theoretical commitments ofthe Court's model, but an understanding of
these commitments is essential to understanding the ways in which the
model has warped the doctrine. An analysis that proceeds solely on the
basis of predictability sets difficult line-drawing tasks; litigation occurs
precisely because legal results are unpredictable, and when unpredictability rises to a sufficient level to warrant remedial adjustment is a question
with no obvious solution. More seriously, by turning to a remedial analysis that is not based on any theoretical account of retroactivity, Fallon and
Meltzer succumb to some of the perennial lures of retroactivity analysis
and end up repeating some ofthe Court's gravest missteps.
For instance, Fallon and Meltzer endorse Stovall's selective prospectivity on direct review. 187 Formalism may be a vice, but incoherence is no
virtue, and incoherence is what selective prospectivity brings. The idea
that getting to the Court first is a legally significant distinction-even in a
remedial calculus-between otherwise identical cases is terribly hard to
justify. Similarly, distinguishing between direct and collateral review requires more than an appeal to the value of finality and the danger of disruption. These concerns are always presented by collateral attacks and
ordinarily do not overcome a constitutional violation in the conduct of a
trial. Absent some relevant theoretical difference between new law and
old law-which the transaction-time model obliterates and remedial
analysis does not replace- finality does not distinguish between habeas
petitions relying on new law and ones urging violations of old law . Nor
does it satisfactorily distinguish between habeas petitions and cases on
direct review, since the states' interests in avoiding disruption and the defendants' interests in application of the new rule are quite similar in both
types of cases. 188
Finally, by viewing appellate review through the lens of remedies,
Fallon and Meltzer neglect the significant fact that courts do not merely
award or withhold remedies ; they decide cases and articulate the law .
True, what an appellant seeks is a reversal , and the reversal may be characterized as a remedy for a past violation-though once we leave the area
of constitutional criminal procedure, this description becomes significantly
less attractive-but the appellant will also get a statement of what the law
187. Seeidatl807.
188. See Griffith v. Kentu cky, 47 9 US. 314, 332 n.l (1 986 ) (White, J. dissenting) (arguin g th at
fmalit y fails to di stin guish betw ee n cas es on direct and co ll ateral review) . White ' s argument th at th e
burdens on the states are identical is overstated: although so me habeas petitions wi ll feature tri als
occurring later than some cases on direct revie w, habeas petitions as a class are likel y to feature older
tri als, for which witnesses and ev idence are more diffi cult to reasse mbl e. That finality is not the
distinguishing feature, howeve r, seems quite true .
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is, and ascertaining what the law is requires more than a remedial analysi s.
Remedial considerations have a large, and perhaps a dominant, role to
play in a sound retroactivity doctrine. Remedial analysis, however, must
be grounded in a determination of what law applies. Attempts to answer
the question of retroactivity by avoiding the theoretical inquiry build on
shaky foundations indeed.

3. Equilibrium Analysis: Jill E. Fisch
In the most recent major scholarly contribution to the literature on
retroactivity, Jill Fisch suggests that retroactivity analysis should proceed
by reference to a model of legal change that analogizes legal regimes to
physical equilibria. Where the existing legal regime is in a stable equilibrium, change should be non-retroactive; where it is unstable, change
should be retroactive. 189
Fisch's article is a work of great sophistication, and its analysis and
critique of the existing retroactivity jurisprudence display deep insight. As
an answer to the question of retroactivity, her equilibrium theory certainly
uses the right factors- notice, reliance, efficiency, etc.-and arrays them
in an interesting way. 190 But like Fallon and Meltzer, she does not imbed
her analysis of legal change in an account of how it is that courts change
the law-what exactly goes on when a decision is "applied retroactively"
(or not) . Consequently, the mechanisms for implementing Fisch's desired
reforms, and also some of their effects, are not investigated . The injunction to avoid retroactivity in disruptions of stable equilibria presumably
requires pure prospectivity-a decision that does not apply the new rule
even to the litigants in the law-changing case. Whether this is permissible
for Article III courts-and I will argue that on the transaction-time model
it is not-is left largely unexamined. 191 There are difficulties Fisch does
not grapple with; her proposals work within the transaction-time model
and hence cannot escape its problems. The following part examines those
probl ems in detail and offers an alternative way of thinking about retroac189. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1100-01. A stable equilibrium is one that returns to the same state
after a di sturbance; an un stable equilibrium will instead end in a different equilibrium state if
disturbed. Fi sch uses th e example of a co in . in stable equilibrium on either face, in unstable
eq uilibrium on edge . In the legal co nte xt, the stabl e/unstab le distin ct ion appears roughly to
correspond to the distin ction between settled and unsettled law .
190. The metaphor of equilibrium, however, is of limited utility, since it is just as hard to app ly as
the concep ts it is to repl ace. The superiority of equilibrium analysis to one th at works in terms of
settled or unsettled law is not obv ious . Simil arly, Fisch suggests that non-retroactivity is approp ri ate
fo r changes to stable equilibria, but adm its that retroactivity may be appropriate for smal l changes.
See id at 1105-07. This is not much more helpful than a '"clear break" analysis, ex cept that it gives a
rather sharper statement of the proposition that there can be no clear break with unsettled law.
191. Fi sc h does undertake a brief inquiry into constitutional limits on non-retroactivity. She finds
few and does not speciticall y address the advisory opinion iss ue . See id at 1073-84 .

CONNECTICUT LA f'V REVIEW

I 110

[VoL 31:1075

tivity questions.

III. THE PROBLEM OF RETROACTIVITY
The question of retroactivity has proved exceedingly difficult to answer. While the scholarship discussed in the preceding section has offered
clever approaches and useful suggestions, it is not fully satisfactory because it dqes not grapple with the underlying conceptual difficulty. This
underlying difficulty is not simply the question of what types of legal
change exist; Jill Fisch's analysis of different kinds of equilibrium and
transitions from one state to another is a more than adequate taxonomy .
The key conceptual issue is rather how legal change is effected: what goes
on when a court changes the law. Analysis of this issue is essential because policy prescriptions that are not based on an understanding of how
courts change the law risk either incoherence, like Fallon and Meltzer's
advocacy of selective prospectivity, or unconstitutionality, like Fisch's
suggestion of pure prospectivity. The problem of retroactivity lies in the
conceptual structure that baffles these policy prescriptions. That structure
is the analytical framework I have been calling the transaction-time model.
As long as the Court continues to decide retroactivity questions within this
model, satisfactory answers are impossible; if the model is abandoned, the
questions are not answered so much as dissolved.

A. The Structure of Retroactivity Analysis: Th e Problem Discovered
The problem of retroactivity, as preceding sections have claimed, is
rooted in the Court's adherence to the transaction-time model. The task of
this section is to show how the model gives rise to the intractable difficulties of retroactivity analysis, and to offer some suggestions as to why we
have arrived at such a theoretical impasse.
1. The Transaction-Time Model and Its Discontents

Since the transaction-time model is the focus of this section , I will
start by taking a moment to recapitulate and give a slightly more detailed
exposition of its operation. Recall that the transaction-time model starts
from the premise that parties should be judged by the law in effect at the
time of their actions. If the decision-time result is to be reached, it must
be because decision-time law is also transaction-time law, i.e., because the
new law is effective retroactively. The transaction-time model thus offers
two options to a court deciding whether to apply a new rule retroactively.
The court may apply the rule retroactively, thus changing the law in effect
at the time of the relevant transaction. It may also announce that the new
rule is to have only prospective effect: it will apply only to cases filed after
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the date of the law-changing decision .
What are the consequences of these dispositions? Retroactive application of new law, as mentioned earlier, changes the law that was in effect
at the time of the parties' actions. Lower court decisions applying the old
law to transactions occurring after the law-changing decision 192 are rendered incorrect and must be reversed on appeal. Final decisions dealing
with transactions after the law-changing decision, likewise, are made incorrect; the law they applied is wrong-and is made wrong even in the
past. 193
Prospective application obviously does not change the law in the past.
Thus it does not inject error into concluded proceedings. A court that
holds a new rule prospective does not require it to be applied to past transactions; it does not apply it even to the transaction in the case before it.
The new rule that it announces is not the law governing the parties' transaction ; it is the law that will be applied to transactions occurring after the
law-changing decision .
This conceptual framework creates two interconnected difficulties.
First, prospective decisionmaking is unconstitutional. That prospective
decisionrnaking is not appropriate for the judiciary has been suggested
before; 194 the above analysis should show why. Jurisdiction is the power to
say what the law is. Federal courts have jurisdiction only over cases and
controversies; they may say what the law is only as an incident to resolving disputes between actual litigants. If this means anything, it means that
federal courts may only say what the governing law is, the law that applies
to the litigants before them. Prospective decisionmaking clearly goes beyond this function; as Justice Cardozo put it, a prospective decision is
merely a "prophecy ... that transactions arising in the future will be governed by a different rule." 195 It is a paradigmatic advisory opinion. Of
192. Of course, the relevant time should be the date of the transacti on in th e law-changing case , but
Linkletter rejects this approach . See supra note 83 and accompan yin g text.
193 . This possibility creates two distin ct se nses of the phrase "wrong wh en dec ided,. From th e
perspective of the court de ciding thi s interm edi ate case, its decision is co rrect as a matter of the settl ed
law at th e time of the dec ision-n ot "wrong when decided ." But from the later perspective of th e
Supreme Court, havin g held the law-changing decision retroacti ve, the intermediate case is wrong as a
matter of the law at the time it was decided, since the holdin g of retroacti vity changes the la w in the
pas t.
The two senses are not always di stin gui shed, and do not need to be ex cept where retroactivity is
at iss ue. l will be using the latter, the criteri on of correctness from th e perspective of the later Court.
A simpl e way to understand thi s se nse is to suppose that decisi ons are pegged to the body of law
exi stin g when they were rendered. Acco rdin g to the transaction-time model , changes in law that hav e
retro active effect make pegged earli er dec isions wrong. From th e perspec tiv e of later courts, they are
wro ng wh en de cided and should be reve rse d if possible.
194. See, eg, James B. Beam Di stillin g Co. v. Geo rgia, 50 1 U.S . 529 , 548-49 ( 1991) (S cali a, J ,
co ncurrin g).
195. Great North ern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co ., 287 U.S . 358,366 (193 2).
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course it is also something more than that, since it creates the rule it predicts will apply . This transparent lawmaking function has been one of the
bases for criticism of prospective decisionmaking, but its advisory character is a sufficient flaw from the perspective of Article III. On the transaction-time model, federal courts cannot engage in prospective decisionmaking.
This fact was recognized by the Stovall Court, though in slightly different tenns; 196 it was the looming threat of advisory opinions that drove
the Court to rule that law-changing decisions must be applied to the pariies
to that case. On the current Court, even the Justices most enamored with
prospectivity have conceded that new rules must be applied in the case that
announces them. 197
Once that is done, however, the full rigidity of the transaction-time
model becomes apparent. Applying the new law to the parties in the lawchanging decision changes the law as of the date ofthat transaction. Cases
coming up on direct review that feature later transactions must be treated
similarly; there is simply no way to distinguish them. 198
Worse follows. The single retroactive application has also changed
the law applicable to cases already finally decided. If the decisions may
be collaterally attacked, there is error for which to attack them. Without a
distinction between old law and new law-and this distinction is precisely
what the transaction-time model eliminates-there is no way to avoid
judging collateral attacks according to the new law, for the holding of retroactivity has made it the old law. The obvious incoherence of the position that law differs according to the procedural posture of a case may
have been one of the factors driving the Stovall Court to abandon the distinction between direct and collateral review. Yet selective prospectivity
does not resolve the underlying difficulty, since applying the new rule
retroactively in even one case has the effect of changing transaction-time
law. 199 The transaction-time model simply cannot accommodate a distinction between direct and collateral review. The Court has been reluctant to

i 96. Stovall characterized th e danger as the prospect that constitutional adjudications mighr '·stand
as meie dictum" but noted that this concern was "rooted in the command of Article III ... that we
reso lve iss ues solely in concrete cases or controversies. " Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293. 30 1 (1967).
197. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 U.S. 656, 689-90 ( 1987) (O ' Co nnor. J , conc urrin g).
Justice Kennedy is O'Connor's staunchest ally in th e fight for prospectivity-a tight that as thi s
section shows , is unwinnable within the transaction-time model.
!98. Consequentl y, Justices looking to minimize the retroactive etlect of law-changing decisions
would do well to shop for cases featuring recent tran sact ions. This itse lf seems somewh at inconsistent
with th e judicial role , but it is at least conceptually coherent.
199. See Beam , 50 1 U.S. at 543 ("Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedl y new
rule , it is chosen for all others who might seek its pros pecti ve application. ").
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face this fact, preferring to rely on an untenable distinction, 200 but the
problem cannot be denied. (Indeed, as the next section shows, the Court
has had to struggle not to admit this consequence of the transaction-time
model and has been only partly successful at keeping it out of the
case law.)
Teague is a solution , but not a happy one, and indeed it is symptomatic
of a larger mistake . In analyzing the difficulties created by the interaction
of retroactivity and collateral attack, both the Court and commentators
have persistently seen habeas, rather than retroactivity, as the source of the
problem .201 They have thus responded by tinkerin g with habeas-and this
confusion has also infected the legislative process. An obvious way to
prevent the feared avalanche of habeas petitions based on new law is to
impose a time limit, or other restrictions, on habeas petitions. This has
been done with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA"). 202
The AEDPA requires petitioners bringing a second or successive habeas petition to obtain certification from a court of appeals that the petition
contains newly discovered evidence establishing innocence, or a new rule
of constitutional law th e Su preme Court has " made retroactive to cases on
collateral review." 203 It al so imposes a one-year limitations period, which
begins to run anew if the Supreme Court announces a new rule of constitutional law and holds it applicable retroactively to cases on collateral reVIeW.

The AEDPA is a c lear example of the shortcomings of try ing to fix a
retroactivity problem by modifying habeas . When combined with the
transaction-time modeL it reaches results that verge on unconstitutionality
in some contexts. Specifically, by allowing new petitions to be based only
on new constitutional rules, it denies relief to actually innocent prisoners.
Here again, positive source is important, since it provides an intuitive
augmentation of the meaning of retroactive application . ln statutory interpretation , I have said, the impulse to adjudicative retroactivity is strongest.
The law does not ch ange, aithough interpretation s do. When the Supreme
200 . See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S . 288 (1989). Finality is th e inte rest usual ly invoked to
distinguish between direct and coll ateral review. The princip le of fin ality does draw a line. but not
the one desired, for finality gives us no reason to distinguish between co ll ateral attacks based on new
law and th ose based on old law. Se e Griffi th v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,332 n.l (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that finality fail s to dis tin gu ish between cases on direct and collateral review)
201. See. eg , Williams v. United States , 401 US. 667 , 701-02 (1971) (Harlan, J. , concurring):
Haddad, supra note 64, at I 076-78 ; Meador, supra note 165. Haddad, ironically. critic izes the Co urt
fo r changin g retroactivity doctrine in order to res hape habeas sub ros a. Changing re troactivi ty
doctrine to elim in ate the trouble with habeas is precisely what shou ld be done .
202 . Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11 0 Stat. 1214 ( 1996)
203 . 28 USC§ 2255 ( 199 4 & Supp . II 1996)
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Court overrules a lower court's interpretation of a statute, it is hard to argue that people convicted under the rejected interpretation are not entitled
to the benefit of the new ruling-it is hard to argue that the lower court's
interpretation was not simply wrong. Thus in statutory interpretation
cases, the AEDPA seems to bar relief for people who are clearly entitled to
it, who were convicted and sentenced for conduct that is not now and
never was a cnme.
This conundrum emerged with particular clarity in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States 204 Bailey interpreted
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which imposes a five-year sentence on anyone who
"uses or carries" a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime." Bailey read "uses" to contain a requirement of
active employment; it was not enough for a Section 924( c) conviction that
the weapon was available for use. 205 And it did so retroactively; it applied
the decision to Bailey himself. The consequence is that people convicted
for merely having a weapon available are clearly innocent. Yet because
Bailey is a case involving statutory interpretation, not the required new
rule of constitutional law, the AEDPA appears to prevent them from
bringing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the habeas counterpart for federal prisoners.
Courts that have confronted this problem have reacted with fancy judicial footwork, typically finding that the inadequacy of Section 2255 relief entitles federal prisoners to the unusual avenue of habeas. 206 Their
creative responses only highlight the fact that the statute is malfunctioning, that attempting to solve retroactivity problems through habeas reform
is a serious mistake. And the problem that Teague and the AEDPA address is quite clearly a consequence of retroactivity, not of habeas. The
scope of issues cognizable on habeas may be set as broadly as those cognizable on appeal; petitions relying on changes in law will still pose no
threat to the administration of justice if they are judged by the law in effect
at the time of their trials. 207 How to do this consistently while applying
new law to cases on direct review is the overwhelming question of retroactivity jurisprudence, and I will answer it later. For now, the point is only
that it cannot be done within the transaction-time model, and tinkering
with habeas does not help.
204. 516US.l37(1995)
205. See id at 150.
206. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainville. 119 F.3d
245 (3d Cir. 1997).
207. There are, of course, those who want to restrict habeas for other reasons. But the troubled
interaction between habeas and retroactivity clearly starts with the Warren Court ' s changes in law.
and clearly stems from the difficulties in distinguishing direct from collateral review
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The embarrassment of selective prospectivity, and the Court's convoluted history of attempts to distinguish between direct and collateral review, are both products of the theoretical framework it has chosen. If it
causes such difficulties, one must wonder why the Court did choose it.
The next section offers a poss ible explanation. 208

2. Origins of the Transaction-Time Model
The premise of the transaction-time model- that parties should be
judged by the legal standards in effect at the time of their actions-has
some obvious attractions . Basic concepts of notice and reliance suggest
that it is unfair to judge parties according to law of which they could not
have known. These concerns have substantial intuitive appeal and feature
prominently in the case law. 209
However, as subsequent sections will show, there are other ways to
give normative weight to notice and reliance. Choice of the transactiontime model may be motivated in the first instance not so much by a concern for protecting expectations as by the "discretionary" conception of
judicial lawmaking. This conception is one in which hard cases confront
judges with substantial indeterminacy. With no right answer available,
judges must effectively legislate new rules as a matter of discretion.
On this understanding, law-changing decisions create new rights and
duties. Applying new rules to parties who acted in good faith reliance on
the law that governed at the time of their actions is si mply unjustifiable. 210
"Retroactive effect," meaning reaching the decision-time result, must be
justified by retroactivity, meaning changing transaction-time law .2 11 The
transaction-time model sees judicial lawmaking as akin to legislative,212

208 . Since this explanation sees the adoption of the transaction-time model as the consequence of a
mi sunderstanding, it is of course onl y tentative. It is certainly presumptuous and perhaps impossibl e
to pinpoint exactly what was misunde rstood.
209 . See, e.g, Chevron Oil Co . v. Huso n, 404 U.S 97, 106-07 (1971) (noting the possible
inequitable results of applying law ret roactive ly).
2 10. See. e.g. , DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 85 (agreeing that " it wo uld be wrong to sac rifice the
rights of an innocent man in the name of so me new duty created afte r th e even t").
2 1i . The justification afforded by retroacti ve alteration of transaction-time law is obviously purely
metaphysical in nature . It offers co ld comfort to parties who relied on old law with the expectation
that it would not be changed. The jurisprudential underpinnings of the transaction-time model, for
those se nsitive to this unfairness, thus lead naturally to a very limited use of retroactivity. The most
limited use would be retroactive app li cati on only in the case announcing the new rule. That is
se lective prospectivity. and it is indeed where the transaction-time model led the Warren Court , in
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 ( 1967).
2 i 2. Thu s the current dominance of the transaction -time model may be a co ntingent consequence
of th e historical fact that modern retroactivity jurisprudence begins with the law-changing crimin al
procedu re dec isions of the Warren Court. whi ch are most eas il y understood as legislative-style
changes in law. The disruptive co nsequences of retroacti vel y imposing new req uirements on the
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and applies to it the same presumption of non-retroactive effect. 213
As an explanation of the Linkletter Court's reasoning, however, the
assimilation of judicial to legislative lawmaking is too pat to be believed.
It is ironic that the Warren Court, under heavy criticism for the sin of "judicial legislation," adopted an analytical framework that admits to precisely that; it may even be revelatory to legal psychoanalysts who believe
in the telling judicial parapraxis. But a recognition that its new rules were
not compelled by precedene 14 cannot have been the conscious motivation
of the Linkletter Court; it had, after all, already applied Mapp to cases
pending on direct review, and pure prospectivity would be the normal
treatment for legislative-style change.
The real explanation for Linkletter's turn to the transaction-time model
is most likely that the Court, having dramatically reshaped constitutional
criminal procedure, was looking for help in rejecting collateral attacks
based on new law. What this required, since the Court had already applied
Afapp to cases on direct review, was a way of distinguishing between direct and collateral review. It is in the quest for this distinction that modern
retroactivity jurisprudence is born. Linkletter invoked the transaction-time
model , most likely, because it succumbed to the delusion that a distinction
between direct and collateral review may be drawn only by an approach
that commits itself to the general proposition that courts should apply the
law in effect at the time of the relevant transaction. Such an approach
does suggest that old law should govern old transactions, and it is to lend
jurisprudential authority to this proposition that Linkletter sets up Blackstone and knocks him down with Austin. But the approach does not distinguish between direct and collateral review, a fact that seems simply to
have escaped the Linkletter Court.
From this perspective, Linkletter appears equal parts comedy and tragedy. The truth is that the desired distinction can in fact be made only
within the model of retroactivity analysis that the Linkletter Court abandoned, the model that had prevented the question of retroactivity from
becoming a problem for the fifty years or so that intervened between the
states, coupled with the imposs ibility of dampening th ese consequences via remedial analysis, led the
Court to seek prospective results within the transacti on-time mod el.
213 . The "presumption" th at I refer to is theoretical and imbedded in the model: Abse nt
retroact ivi ty, transaction-time re sults are proper. This does not mean that the transaction-time model ,
as empl oyed by the Court, tends to produce those results; the possibility of retroactivity means that
application of transact ion-time law can still produce decision-time results. Although the Warren
Co urt o ften reached transacti on-time re sults, subsequent Courts, working largely within the same
mod el, have changed direction so drastically as to make decision-time results the norm.
214. See Linkl etter v Walker 381 U.S . 618, 630 (1965) ("[T]he federai exclusionary rule was not
The decision was a matter of
·derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment .
judici al implication.'") (quoting Wolfv . Co lorado. 338 U.S. 25 , 28 (1949)).

-
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death of the Blackstonian understanding and the Warren Court 's reworking of retroactivity. This model, and the solutions it offers, are the subject
ofthe next section.

B. Eliminating Retroactivity: The Problem Solved
The transaction-time model has dealt courts two difficulties: it makes
pure prospectivity unconstitutional, and it creates real problems with collateral review. The first is not so major; more importantly, it is unavoidable . A purely prospective decision is advisory no matter how one looks
at it. The second is more serious; it is what drove retroactivity doctrine on
its erratic course between Linkleiter and Teague, and it is still with us, as
the troubling new issues created by the AEDPA show. The solution lies in
understanding why the problem used to be a non-issue, why retroactivity
was not a difficult question until Linkletter.

1. The Dog That Didn't Bark and the Decision-Time Model
Until the 1960s, the question of retroactivity was a dog that did not
bark . Like that of its famous Holmes 215 counterpart, its silence tells us
something important. Admittedly, until the dramatic innovations of the
Warren Court, the question did not have the same degree of importance.
But the issue existed; it is clearly present in cases such as Carpenter v.
Wabash Railway Co.216 and Chico! County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank. 217 What distinguishes the smooth analysis of those cases from
the Warren Court's lugubrious flailings is that they did not employ the
transaction-time model, nor even the concept of retroactivity . They s imply followed the general rule that a court must decide the cases before it
according to the best current understanding of the law. 218
This principle is the keystone of the alternate conceptual approach to
retroactivity analysis, what I call the "decision-time model." Where the
transaction-time model supposes that the legally relevant rights and duties
are those existing at the time of the parties ' actions, the decision-time
mode l starts from the opposite premise. Courts should apply th e ir current
best understanding of the law to all cases before them, regard less of
whether the best understanding at the time of the transaction would produce a different result.

21 5. Sherlock. not Oliver Wendell Jr. See SIR ARTHUR CO!'-!AN DOYLE, TH E COM PLETE 0RI GIN.'\L
ILL USTRA TED SH ERLOCK HOL MES (SIL VER BLAZE) 11 7 ( 1976).
216 . 309 U.S. 23 , 27 (1940) (explaining that if a law intervenes and changes the govern ing ru ic
after the judgment and before appellate review, appe llate court must obey new law).
217. 308 U.S 371, 374-7 5 (1940) (refusing to up set ajudgment based on a subseque nt chan ge in
the law).
2 18. See. e g, Chico!, 308 U. S at 377.
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A Court confronted with a "retroactivity question" thus has no choice
in what law to apply if it is using the decision-time model. Current law
governs, and the authority of a law-changing decision cannot be denied.
Like the transaction-time model, however, the decision-time model can
usually reach either result in terms of who wins the case.
Producing the transaction-time result requires some work and may not
always be possible. In many cases, however, use of the law of remedies
will permit it. Suppose that the law-changing decision adopts a different
statute of limitations, and that the injured party brings his suit before the
expiration of the statute of limitations prevailing at the time he files. The
suit may be time-barred under the new statute of limitations, but timely
under the old. A court troubled by the unfairness of denying relief to an
injured party based on new law might nonetheless allow the suit to proceed by equitably tolling the new statute of limitations. 219 Despite applying decision-time law, the court can nonetheless reach the transaction-time
result. Reaching the decision-time result is more straightforward. Without any discussion of retroactivity, the Court simply applies the current
law. 220
The significant advantage of the decision-time model emerges when it
is realized that this approach has no effect on the earlier law. While the
transaction-time model requires a court to alter transaction-time law in
order to achieve retroactive effect, the decision-time model does not. Earlier decisions, pegged to their contemporaneous law, are consequently
correct, although they will not be followed.
2.

Why the Decision Time-Model?

Like the transaction-time model, the decision-time model is linked to a
particular conception of judicial decisionmaking, and a choice of the decision-time model may be motivated in part by a different understanding of
the judicial role. The province of the judiciary is to say what the law is,
not what it was; one can maintain a priori that it is the duty of judges to

219. This approach was rejected in Lampf Pleva. Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, SO 1
U.S. 350, 361 ( 1991 ), and seems never to have been adopted by a majority of the Court. At different
times, however, a number of Justices have commented that the question of what law applies should be
distinguished from the question of what remedy may be granted. See. e.g, Harper v. Virginia Dep't
of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 131-34 ( 1993) (O'Connor, l, dissenting) (pointing out that applying the
rule retroactively is a separate question from the remedy to be given): James B. Beam Distilling Co. v
Georgia. 501 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1991) (distinguishing the issue of applying a law forward or
backward from determining remedies): United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 US 286, 297 ( 1970)
(Harlan. J., concurring) (noting that the flexibility in the law of remedies does not affect the fact that
generally courts should apply the prevailing rule)
220. For an example of this approach. see Lampf, 501 U.S at 361.

..
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decide cases based on their best understanding of the law. 221 However, the
decision-time model may draw its attractiveness largely from the "right
answer" conception of judicial lawmaking. This conception, naturally
enough, is diametrically opposed to the one motivating the transactiontime model. On this understanding, judicial lawmaking, while it may
change results, reaches the right answer to the particular legal question
posed. 222 Applying decision-time law on the " right answer" conception is
simply reaching the just result in the case at hand .223 Concerns of notice
and reliance may have weight within this model, 224 but they must be taken
into account in a remedial calculus. 225
The "right answer" and the "discretionary" theories are competing
visions of judicial decisionmaking. They can be loosely linked, respectively, to natural law and positivist theories. 226 If the content of "law" is
extended to include broad moral and political principles, then it is obviously easier to maintain that judicial decisions reach the right answer; if

221 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,68 1 (1971) (Harlan , J , concurrin g).
222 . See Beam, 501 U.S at 549 (Scali a, J., concurring) (stating that judges make Jaw "as th ough
th ey were ' finding it'-discerning wh at the Jaw is, rather than decre eing what it is today changed to" );
DWORKIN, supra note 23 , at 81-87 . Dworkin's views have evolved over th e ye ars, and his more
recent work seems to place less emphasis on the principle that adj udicati on simply enforces
preexistin g le gal rights. See DWORKIN, supra note 177, at 225 ("So law as integrity rejects as
unhelpful the ancient questi on wh eth er judges find or invent law ; we understand legal reasonin g, it
suggests, onl y by seeing the se nse in which the y do both and neither. ").
223. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 , 259 (1969) (Harlan , J , dissenting)
("[No nretroactivity] would belie the trui sm that it is the ta~k of thi s Co urt, like that of any other, to do
justi ce to each litigant on the merits of his own case. ").
224 . See , e.g., United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 103, 110 ( 18 01) (noting that
the court sho uld consider the effec t on parties when applying Jaw retroac tively in ce rtain cases).
225. Greater focus on remedi al di sc retion would certainly benefi t retro act ivity jurisprudence, as
Fallon and Meltzer and others have argued. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42; Note,
Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule: A UnifYing Approach, 97 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1984)
(analyzing the retroactivity of Fourth Amend ment decisions). Eve n on th e transaction-time model,
rem edial adjustments are possib le foll owing a co nclusion that deci sion-tim e law is to be applied
retroac ti ve ly. See, e.g .. Beam , 50 1 U.S. at 535 (app ly ing a law retroactively may affect the rem edy
give n). Thi s route to the remed ial ca lcu lus is so mewhat circuitous, but if there were any reasons for
fav orin g the transaction-tim e model , it mig ht have been des irabl e.
226. In pa rti cul ar, my discuss ion of th e decisio n-time model prominentl y features a noti on akin to
Ronald Dworki n's ''righ t an swer" thes is. See DWO RKI N, supra note 23, at 87, 279-80 ; see also
DWORK IN. s upra note 177, at 266-71. The concept of le gal in determinacy requiring judici al
di sc reti on re lates similarly to H.L .A. Hart's positivist theory. See lf.L.A . HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 244-54 (2d ed. 1994) Howeve r, the con nections between th e legal phil oso phies and the model s
are weaker than they may seem at fir st glance. Dworkin's ideas appear on both sides; the transactiontime model is produced by conjoining Dwo rkin 's "rights thesis," see DWORKIN, supra note 23. at 8290, with a p os iti vist/reali st account of law-chang ing decision s. (A not entirely happy marriage, to be
sure.) Dwo rkin himse lf argues for the enfo rce ment of transacti on-tim e Jaw as a matter of principle but
seems to suppos e that the correct dec ision-tim e an swer is the same . Thi s neo-Bl acksto ni an approach,
as disc ussed earlier, elides the ques ti on o f wh at happens when law changes be twee n transaction and
decision.
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"law" is more narrowly construed, it appears that judicial decisionmaking
is more often discretionary. These linkages invite more exploration, but I
hope to avo id the quagmire of jurisprudence. 227 My purpose is emphatically not to argue for the adoption of o ne or the other model on the basi s of
its philosophical pedigree.
Moreover, the success ive embrace of non-retroactivity by the Warren
and Burger Courts shows that results, in the se nse of retroactivity o r nonretroactivity, are not tied to political program s; nor, a fortiori , are models.
Because polit ical valence changes over time, 228 a theoretical investigation
of retroacti v ity should be able also to avoid the ideologi cal thicket. My
aspiration is merely to achieve a perspicuous rendering of the theoretical
structure of retroactivity analysis and a prescription for enhanced clarity
and coherence. The two mode ls differ in their abilities to reach particular
results; consequentl y, there are good reasons to se lect the one that allows
our current regime to be presented as a body of doctrine formed by consistent application of principl es rather th an one that is internally contradictory and relies on unjustifiable distincti ons.
In particular, as mentioned above, the deci s ion-tim e model all ows
courts to apply a change in the law to cases pending on direct review without creating error in concluded proceedings. Th e problem of collateral
attack does not arise; the deci s ion-time model distingui shes between direct
and coll ateral review.
The mechanics of the distinction are fairl y straightforward. On direct
rev iew, an appellate court re-examines contested issues according to the
best current understandin g of the law. Thus, affirman ce o n direct rev iew
call s for repetiti on: An affirmed deci s ion has the auth ority of the affirming
court behind it.
Collatera l review works differentl y. Fo r a dec is io n to surv ive collateral review, the reviewing court must asseri not that the result would be
the sam e if the case were liti gated at the time of the co ll atera l attack, but
merely that the decis ion was correct when rendered. O f course, this principl e is seldom apparent in civil cases. Res j udicata o rdinaril y prevents
reli tigati on of claim s, and it will shi e ld even a deci sion that was wrong
227. The debate ove r whether law is "made" or "fo un d,'' wh ich corres ponds ro ughl y to my
discretio nary/ri ght an swer mod els of judi cial lawm ak ing, is interesting from a metaph ys ical
pe rspec ti ve bu t no t ve ry use fu l. Ne ither acco unt is es peciall y plausib le as a descripti on of all , or eve n
the esse nce of, judici al deci sions . Jud ging is a craft: its instan ces are rel ated not by deriv ati on from a
platoni c un ive rsal but by a fami ly rese mblance. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 226. My prescriptive
clai m is th at di sparate ty pes of judicial lawm akin g no nethe less re quire a unifie d retroactivity an alys is,
in orde r to produ ce stabl e and coherent doc trine. Thu s, what is esse ntial is to select a parti cul ar
anal yti cal framewo rk rather than wa ndering in the me ta phys ical desert.
228 . See J.M. Balkin, !deolagical Drift and the Struggle Over ,'v!eaning, 25 CoNN . L. RE V. 869
( 1993).
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when rendered. Importantly, however, the principle does operate in cases
where the issue is whether res judicata is available as a defense; it is this
fact that allows us to discern the nature of collateral review. 229
In criminal cases, where the writ of habeas corpus allows for broader
collateral challenges, the nature of collateral review obviously assumes
greater importance. The availability of habeas is not restricted by the ordinary rules of res judicata, and relitigation of iss ues is permitted .230 Habeas is, nonethele ss, a col lateral remedy, focusing on the correctness of the
judgment when rendered . For example, repeal of a criminal law, which
clearly bars future prosecutions and abates those for which appeal is
pending, 231 does not provide grounds for a habeas petition .232 A change in
law, on the decisi on-time model, has no effect on the soundness of an earlier judgment; a decision-time result on direct review does not alter the
law applicable to a habeas petitioner. 233 It is only the transaction-time
229. As Justi ce Harlan pointed out in Mackey v. United S tates , 401 US 667 . 698 (1971) (Harlan,
1., co ncurring), Chicot was such a case and employed precisely the analysis I advocate . Chico/
featured an attempt to attack co ll aterally a plan of debt readjustment iss ued by a district court
pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional. See Chi cot County Drainage Di st. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 US 37 1.373-74 (1940). Res judicata prevents parties from relitigating iss ues th at were or
co uld have been raised in an earlier proceed ing, with an exception for void judgments. Lack of
subject-matter jurisdi ctio n rend ers a judgment void, so if the statute providing jurisdi ction is
unconst itutional, res judicata cannot be raised as a defen se. The Chico/ Court allowed the res judicata
defense based on the proposition that th e statute granting jurisd iction to the di strict cou rt was
co nstitutional at the tim e of the debt readjustment, havin g been so adjudged by that co urt . See id. at
377-78. This treatment of collateral revi ew is the direct analog to the argument thi s Article makes
about the conseq uence s of the decision-time model for habe as. Using the decision-time model, a
court engaged in collateral review need concern itself only with the question of whether the
challenged deci sion was righ t when rend ered. A sim ilar approach was followed in Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S 701, i06 ( 1969) (applying approac h to Louisiana law giving right to vote only to
" property tax paye rs") .
230. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 118, at 1345.
231. See, eg , United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 , 223 (1 934) (holding that cases pending for
vio lati ons of the Nati onal Prohibition Act cou!d not be conti nued when the Eighteen th Amendment
was repealed). Legislatures may , of course , provide by savings clauses that pending prosecutions are
to continue despite repeal. See, e g, 1 U S . C.~ 109 ( 1994)
232. See, e.g, Welch v. Hudspeth. 132 F.2d 434 , 436 (I Ot h Cir. 1942) (de nying collateral relief to
petitioner whose conviction became final before repeal of Prohibition). As I argu e below, an
exception exists for petiti oners whose conduct is held constitutionally protected after their convictions
become final. The repeal of Prohibition does not, of course, qualify for this exception because the
Twenty-first Amendment did not recogni ze a constitutional right to manufacture or se ll liquor.
233 . The prevailing drift of scholarship on this point, interestingly, seems to run in directly th e
opposite direction, arguing th at even non-retroactive application of law-c hanging decisions should
allow habeas petitioners to benefi t. See, e.g., Meador, supra note 165. Meador starts from th e
premi se that imprisonment is an ongoing sanction-which is clearly true- and co ntends that "the
situati on is as though the warden appeared at the prisoner 's ce ll every morning bearing th e illegally
se ized ev iden ce in hi s hands, thereby using it to keep th e prisoner in confinement for anoth er day ."
ld. at 111 7. That thi s conclusion simpl y cann ot be correct ca n be see n by imagini ng a change in
Federal Ru les of Crimin al Procedure-requiring, for example, yellow paper where before green was
requir<:d . We cannot say, in adjudging a petition under 28 U.S C.~ 225 5 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). that
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model, with its retroactive creation of error in earlier trials, that allows
habeas petitioners the benefit of law-chan g ing decisi o ns . The decisiontime model thus itself makes the distinction between direct and collateral
review that so plagued the Warren Court.234
This distinction does not mean , of course, that a habeas petitioner can
never win relief on the decision-time model. Habeas lies for pri soners
held "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." 235 Incarceration after a change in law might violate the Con stitution in two primary ways-ways which, interestingl y enough , precisely
track the Harlan/Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity on collateral reVIew .

First, a prisoner seeking the benefit of a new constitutional rule that
placed " certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" should be able to
argue that his continued imprisonment is unconstitutional. 236 The argument for this result relies on a distinction between privative sanctions such
as fines, which can be remedied only retroactively, and on going sanctions
such as incarceration, which can be remedied prospective ly. Continued
punishment requires continuing power to proscribe. If certain conduct is
held constitutionally protected, the government loses the ability to punish
it, and continued sanctions are imposed only in violation of the Constitution .237 Thus collateral attack should be able to win prospective relief

·'the warden shows up eve ry day bearin g the green paper; and now th at ye ll ow is re quired the prisone r
must go free." Paper ch anges , o f course, co uld be dealt with by harmless error analysi s, and a
stro nge r po int against Meador's argume nt is the fact that ev en re pe a l o f the law under whi ch a
crimi nal is impriso ned wil i not all ow coll ateral attack o n th e co nv icti on.
234. Thi s is not to say th at it make s habeas s impl e. A co urt faced with a habeas pet iti on re lyi ng on
new law mu st stii! dec ide if the law is actuall y new- whi ch may depend on its pos itive source or on
more practical cons iderations. Shorn o f the juris prud en tial woo l th at clin gs to th e ide a o f " new law,"
thi s is essentiall y the questi on o f ret roactiv ity, and as such it is not th e co nce rn of the Arti c le. F isch 's
equilibrium analysis, or Fa llon and Me ltzer 's appro ach through re me di es, are good examples o f
atte mpts to deve lop rul es fo r dec idin g th at iss ue; it is wo rk enough fo r thi s Arti cle to reac h a pos iti o n
in whi ch th e decisi on is poss ibl e. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 ; Fi sc h, supra note I.
235 . Judi c iary Act o f 1867 , ch. 28, ~ I, 14 Stat. 385-86 ( 1867) .
236. Such seems to be the dominant practi ce. In United States ex rei. Williams v. Preiser, 360 F.
Supp . 667 (S. D.N. Y . 1973), a ph ys ic ian co nv icted und er a state aborti o n-mans la ughter statute wo n
re lease after th e decis io n in Roe v. Wade , 41 0 U.S . 11 3 (1 973). See also Robin so n v. Ne il , 409 U. S.
505 , 5 10-11 ( 1973) (notin g that Linkletter an alys is is in appli cabl e to non-procedural ri g hts)
237. See United States v. United States Coi n & Cu rren cy, 40 1 U.S. 7 15, 726-27 (1 97 1) (Bre nnan ,
1., co ncurrin g) (stating th at "a dec ision holdi ng certain co nd uct beyo nd the powe r o f gov ernment to
sancti o n or prohi bit must be applied to preve nt the contin ui ng impos iti o n o f sancti o ns fo r co nduct
eng age d in be fore the date of that dec ision"). Thi s pro position seems und eniabl e; it is hard to
imag ine, as Brenn an goes o n to note , th at Virg ini a mi ght keep in jail inte rrac ial cou ples who had
coh ab ited w ithin th e state before Loving v. Virginia, 38 8 U.S. I ( 1967). Se e Un ited States Coin, 401
U. S . at 728. United States Coin in fa ct we nt further: it all owe d privati ve sanc ti o ns (forfe itures) to be
undo ne alth ough the law a uth orizi ng th e m had bee n uph e ld by th e Suprem e Co urt si xtee n years
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based on a change in constitutional law. Incarceration, like injunction,
operates in futuro ; the soundness of continued imprisonment should be
analyzed under the law at the time of the challenge. 238 Imprisonment for
conduct that is constitutionally protected is a constitutional violation regardless of how sound the trial or how new the right.
Teague's second exception, for challenges to procedures that both
violate fundamental fairness and relate to the accuracy of the trial, is not
quite so clearly a consequence of the decision-time model. Whether it is
or not depends on our understanding of due process. In an influential article, Paul Mishkin suggested that due process requirements going to the
accuracy of a verdict represent a constitutional guarantee that no one shall
be imprisoned except upon a showing of guilt with a certain required degree of probability. 239 This is functionally true, and makes good sense as
theory. And it follows, on this view, that habeas petitioners get the benefit
of new rules of constitutional law relating to the accuracy of the trial.
Their convictions may have been sound, but the constitutional guarantee
does not only bar new conviction s. It requires the States to justify imprisonment by a particular showing, and if that showing has not been made,
imprisonment cannot continue. Once again, the ongoing nature of the
sanction and the availability of prospective relief make all the difference.
Th e preservation of thi s exception may be of only minor consequence,
since the Court has yet to announce a new such "component[] of basic due
process" 240 and has indicated substantial doubt that any exist
undiscovered. 241 Regardless, judging collateral attacks in general, and
habeas petitions in particular, by the law prevailing at the time of the

earli er aga inst th e Fifth Amendment challenge that prevailed in Uni ted States Coin See id. at 722 ;
see also Lewis v. United States , 348 U.S . 419 (1955 ). Thi s stronger position is unsound, and it won
th e supp ort of only four Ju sti ces.
238 . See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Ce ntral Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921)
(stating th at .. because reli ef by injunction ope rates in f uturo , . .. the right to it must be determined as
of the tim e of the hearin g"); FED. R. Cl v. P. 60(b)(5) (providing for reevaluation of injunctions in
li ght of changed ci rcumstances). Evaluatin g imprisonment und er the law obtaining at the time of the
challenge does not, of course. mean that repeal of criminal laws should allow collateral attack on
co nvi cti ons on th at basis. See Welch v. Hudspeth , 132 F.2d 434, 436 (l Oth Cir. 1942) (denying
col lateral relief to petitioner whose co nvic ti on beca me fin al before repeal of Prohibition) . The
go vernment's poH er to puni sh conduct is not called into qu esti on by repeal of a law. It is only where
punishment is constituti onall y forbidden that prospect ive reli ef sho uld be granted on co llateral review .
The question of chall engin g a repeal ed statute on the gro unds th at the once-prosc ribed co nduct
is constitutionally protected presents a slightly more diffi cult issue, also created by statutes held
un co nstituti onal on ground s (e.g .. vaguen ess or ove rbreadth) that do not suggest that a petiti oner 's
co nduct is co nstituti onall y protected . Presumably, justice requ ires th at a petiti one r be all owed to ra ise
th e argum en t. desp ite the fact that the statute is no longe r in force.
239. See Mishkin , supra note 76, at 8 1-82 .
240. Teague v. Lane, 48 9 U.S. 288, 313 ( 1989).
24 1. See id
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original trial seems by far the sounder course. Justice demands no more,
and logic no less. Wholesale adoption of the decision-time model could
have spared the Court the difficulties it confronted.
In fact, the decision-time model entirely eliminates the theoretical
structure that drove the Warren Court to its unsatisfying inconsistencies.
It solves the problem of retroactivity. The silence of the question of retroactivity before Linkletter is thus precisely the same as that in Arthur Conan Doyle's Silver Blaze . The dog did not bark because it recognized its
master.
When Linkletter introduced the transaction-time model, it did not offer
the best possible response to a difficult new problem. It created the problem and offered a plainly inadequate response. I have tried to suggest why
it did so; the next question is why the decision-time model did not make
its way back. Answering this question does not require quite the same
degree of speculation; the model's attempt to do so, and its ultimate failure, are there in the caselaw . The exile of the decision-time model and its
unsuccessful return is the hidden story of retroactivity jurisprudence. The
next section tells it for the first time.

3. Why Not the Decision-Time Model? The Secret History
of Retroactivity
Viewing the caselaw with an awareness of the two models produces a
picture startlingly different from the received wisdom . The struggle over
retroactivity-the vacillation between decision-time and transaction-time
result-has been a mask for the deeper conflict between the two models.
It has been, in many ways, a proxy war, and while decision-time result has
won most of the battles, the decision-time model has lost the heans and
minds of the federal bench. At the level of result, the current embrace of
retroactivity has returned us to where we started. But in terms of the models, things are quite different. By rereading the caselaw from this perspective, we may know the place for the first time.
To understand the cases in terms of the dueling models, it is important
to be able to ascertain which one a court is employing. Because the distinction between the two has never been explicitly addressed, this is not
always easy. A decision that announces that new Jaw will be applied only
prospectively is clearly working within the transaction-time model.
Harder issues are presented by cases that apply new Jaw retroactively . The
decision-time model, by applying new law, produces automatic retroactive
effect. It does not, however, rely on the concept of retroactivity to do so,
and this fact allows the distinction to be made.
If the decision-time model is adopted, the concept of "retroactivity"

•
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drops out of the analysis. Decision-time law is applied without retroactively changing transaction-time law, for the simple reason that only decision-time law is relevant. Given this fact, the framing ofthe issue in terms
of retroactivity is itself an indicator of the transaction-time model.
It might seem surprising that this is really a reliable indicator. Surely,
one might think, once the Court began to talk about retroactivity, cases
presenting the issue used the terminology, and diction ceased to be revelatory. I would agree with this objection if the concept of retroactivity did
pervade the case law, if after Linkletter the Supreme Court never achieved
retroactive effect without a mention of retroactivity. But the reality is otherwise. Several Justices have urged analyses that do not mention retroactivity/42 and several cases have applied new law without discussing the
concept. 243 The decision-time model is there in the caselaw, and its proponents have been remarkably consistent in employing its distinctive vocabulary. Cases that analyze the issue in terms of "retroactivity" are thus
best understood as employing a transaction-time model.
The decision-time model also has its indicators. As discussed above, a
decision that grants retroactive effect to new law without discussing retroactivity must work within the decision-time model. More obviously, decisions that assert that courts must decide cases based on their best current
understanding of the law employ decision-time analysis. A final mark of
this approach is the assertion that earlier inconsistent decisions were correct. As noted earlier, the transaction-time model reaches decision-time
results by retroactively altering transaction-time law. This creates error in
earlier decisions; thus, an opinion that characterizes earlier decisions as
correct must employ the decision-time model.
This last indicator is not entirely reliable, given the two different
senses of "correct when decided." 244 It does, however, tend to match up
well in the caselaw with the indicia considered previously. 245 Using these
criteria, it is possible to identify the model driving the analysis in virtually
every case. What emerges is a persistent struggle subject to the vagaries
of Court membership and the exigencies of doctrinal change.
The story begins with the demise of the Blackston ian conception of
law, which freed the two models to compete. Because the practice under

242. See, e.g. Williams v United States, 401 US 667,679 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 US. 529, 548-49 ( 1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
243. See, e.g, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 US 350 (1991);
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S 538 (1941).
244. See supra note 193.
245. For examples of decision-time model cases characterizing earlier decisions as correct, see
Vanden bark, 311 U.S. at 543, and United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) l 03, 110
(1801)

I
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the Blackstonian understanding was to give automatic etTect to later
statements of the law, the decision-time model had a significant advantage. Already enshrined in Marshall ' s The Schooner Peggy opinion , it
quickly extended its reach to law-changing decisions. Within the decision-time model, the concept of retroactivity plays no role, and Supreme
Court decisions through the 1940s, relying heavily on The Schooner
Peggy, applied decision-time law without discussion in cases where
changes were wrought by intervening legislation 246 or decisions .247 Vandenbark v. Ch'ens-Jllinois Glass Co. 24 8 explicitly repudiated Burgess and
Kuhn, holding that federal courts "should conform their orders to the state
law as of the time of the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will
thus cause the reversal of judgments which were correct when entered." 249
The conflict began in earnest with Linkletter. That decision planted
itself squarely, if ineptly, within the transaction-time model. 250 But it soon
became apparent that Linkletter's grounds were too hot to stand on; with
Stovall the Court began a frenetic dance, protecting one part of its sensitive jurisprudence only to expose another to the fire of criticism. 251 From
the beginning, the transaction-time model was beset with difficulty, as the
Court tried to draw lines that its own theory erased. Justice White ' s
Engle-Hankerson approach to habeas petitions offered the possibility of
achieving different results for collateral and direct review within the transaction-time framework. Had the Court followed thi s line of reasonin g
(and abandoned selective prospectivity in favor of uniformly retroactive
result on direct appeal), it would have done the best it could with the tool s
at hand, and a stable body of doctrine might have resulted. The opinions

246 . See, e.g, Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co ., 309 U.S. 23 (1 940) . Carpe nrer. like The Schooner
Peggy, is best understood as standing for decision-time iaw rather than dec ision-time result. The
pending in an y court of th e
statute at issue explicitly provided for application to cases "now .
United States." ld at 27 (quoting Bankruptcy Act, 53 Stat. 1406 (1 939) (codifi ed at II USC. ~
205(n)) (repealed 1978)).
247. See, e.g., Vandenbark, 311 U.S. at 538.
248 . See id
249 . /d at 543.
250. That the decision-time model was the exi sting baseline that Linkle rrer disturbe d can be see n
from the fact where the issue was retroactive legislation, which Linklerrer did not discuss, the
decision-time model persisted in a line of cases relying on The Sch ooner Peggy, and running through
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham , 393 U.S. 268 ,231 (1 969), up to Bradley v. School Board of
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). Bradley is illustrative: "We anch or our holdin g in this case on
the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision . ." !d Thi s
line effectively came to an end when the Supreme Court re evaluated leg islati ve retro activity in
Landgraf v. US! Film Prods , 511 US . 244 (1994 ).
251. Colorful metaphors for the Court 's wild retroactivity juri sprudence an: not un co mmon. See.
e g, Williams v. United States, 401 U S. 667, 676 ( 1971) (Harl an, J , di sse nting) (lamenting that th e
course of the Linkleller doctrine has become " alm os t as diffi cul t to foll ow as the tracks made by a
beast of prey in search of its intended victim").
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of Justice Harlan, however, offered both the possibility of another way and
attacks on the transaction-time model that eventually proved irresistible.
That his criticisms did not produce an ascendancy of the decision-time
model results from two failures to distinguish between model and resultone on the part of the Griffith Court, and one on the part of Justice Harlan
himself.
Justice Harlan's recommendations for the treatment of cases on direct
review clearly urge the adoption of a decision-time model. 252 His discussions of such cases never call for "retroactive application" of decisions but
simply for application of "the prevailing decisional rule." 253 Transactiontime results, in Justice Harlan's view, may be produced by the law of
remedies/ 54 but this question is distinct from the issue of what law to apply. The demand that courts "apply the Jaw as it is at the time, not as it
once was," 25 5 speaks to the analytical model but does not require any particular result.
When majority support for this analysis on direct review emerged,
however, it operated at the level of result. Although Griffith v. Kentucky
claims to adopt Justice Harlan's position, its recurrent invocation of "retroactive application" 256 marks it quite clearly as a product of the transaction-time model. Moreover, as subsequent cases made clear/ 57 Griffith
rejected only selective prospectivity; it did not speak to the possibility of
refusing to apply a new rule in the case in which it was announced. The
vindication of Justice Harlan's views announced in Griffith was only partial.
Griffith did not itself mark the resurgence of the decision-time model
for cases on direct review, but given the persistent conflation of model and
result, Griffith's decision-time result pushed towards the decision-time
model. Adoption of the Harlan analysis for habeas petitions, on the other
hand, offered no support to the decision-time model because Justice
Harlan himself had remained within the transaction-time model. Apparently believing that applying decision-time law to habeas petitions would
result in "readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in

252. See. e.g , William s, 401 U.S . at 681 ("! continue to believe that a proper perception o f our
duties as a court of law .. . mandates that we appl y the law as it is at the time, not as it o nce was.");
United States v. Estate of Do nnell y, 397 U.S . 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan , J., concurring) ("[O]nce the
de cision to abandon prece dent is mad e, I see no justification for applying principl es determined to be
wro ng, be they co nstituti onal or otherwi se, to litigants who are in or may still come to court.").
253. Estate of Donnelly, 397 US. at 297.
254. See id. at 296-97 .
255. William s, 401 U.S. at 681.
256 . See Griffith v. Kentu cky, 479 U.S. 314 , 316, 318, 322 , 32 8 (1987)
257 . See, e.g, Jame s B. Beam Dis tilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 1 U.S 529,538 (199 1).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1128

[Vol 31:1075

effect when a habeas petition is filed," 258 Justice Harlan instead urged the
application of transaction-time law. 259 Noting the desirability of "leaving
concluded litigation in a state of repose," he concluded that concerns for
finality could defeat the judicial presumption in favor of applying the best
current understanding of the law. 260 When Teague v. Lane approved Justice Harlan's reasoning, it understandably did so within a transaction-time
model.
Far more puzzling than the transaction-time framework of the Teague
Court is Justice Harlan's abandonment of the decision-time model for habeas cases, an unsound and unnecessary step by a great jurist. The position is unsound because finality is unacceptable as a normative justification. The interest in finality is always present, and ordinarily does not
overcome a constitutional violation in the conduct of a trial. Because the
transaction-time model erases the difference between old and new law, the
principle of finality cannot distinguish between habeas petitions relying on
new law and ones urging violations of old law. Nor does it satisfactorily
distinguish between habeas petitions and cases on direct review, since the
States' interests in avoiding disruption and the defendants' interests in
application of the new rule are quite similar in both types of cases. 261
Justice Harlan's invocation of finality is also unnecessary within the
decision-time model. On the transaction-time model, a retroactive decision works to change transaction-time law, and thus obviously changes the
law applicable to the habeas petitioner as well. The same is not true from
the decision-time perspective. The consequence of the decision-time
model, as noted above, is that earlier decisions (pegged to their respective
dates) are correct. By preserving the correctness of earlier decisions, the
decision-time model distinguishes between direct and collateral review in
a way that the transaction-time does not.
While neither Griffith nor Teague marked the return of the decisiontime model, their invocations of Harlan and their embrace of decision-time
results on direct review showed that the time was ripe for a countercoup.
The presence on the Court of conservative Justices, notably Antonin
Scalia, who subscribed to the "right answer" model of judicial lawmaking,
provided the needed impetus. In American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith, 262 the
two models met head-on. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four,
gave a clear statement of the transaction-time approach. 263 Invoking Chev258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Williams, 401 U.S. at 683.
See id
See id
See supra note 188.
496 U.S 167 (1990).
See id at 171-200.
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ron Oil, in what was to be its last appearance in an opinion of the Court,
she urged the limitation of Griffith to the criminal context and concluded
that the Scheiner decision should not be applied retroactively. 264
The dissent, by contrast, offered an analysis rooted in the decisiontime model. Also writing for four Justices, Justice Stevens argued that
"adherence to legal principle requires that we determine the rights of litigants in accordance with our best current und erstanding of the law. " 265
Quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estate of Donnelly, he concluded
that "'while there is flexibility in the law of remedies, this does not affect
the underlying substantive principle that short of a bar of res judicata or
statute of limitations, courts should apply the prevailing decisional rule to
the cases before them. "' 266
Justice Scalia provided the necessary fifth vote for transaction-time
result. But, much like the Gelpcke Court, he did so from a Blackstonian
perspective, admitting the authority of the earlier decision but denying its
correctness. Thus while five members of the Court were willing to reach
the transaction-time resu lt, five were also clearly lined up behind the decision-time model. Subsequent cases showed, however, that the Justices did
not view the issue with the clarity in which Smith had presented it.
Two cases handed down on th e same day in 1991, James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia267 and Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilb ertson ,268 highli ghted the tension within the Court. The fivemember Lampf majority applied decision-time law with no mention of
retroactivity-an opinion c learl y within the dec is ion-time model. 269 In
James Bearn, by contrast, the Court reached a dec ision-time result via retroactive application of the new rule. 270 The two-Justice plurality, along
with one concurring Justice a nd the three dissenters, employed the transaction-time model. 271 Only the three-Justice concurrence, composed of

264 . See id at 178-79.
265. fd at 2i4 (Stevens, J , dissenting).
266. fd at 2 15 (q uoti ng United States v Es tate of Donnelly, 397 U.S 286, 297 ( 1970) (Harlan, J.,
co ncurring)).
267. 501 us 529 (1991) .
268 . 50 1 U.S. 350 ( 1991)
269 . See id. at 35 i .
270. See Beam, 50 I U S at 544.
27 1. See id at 532. Justi ce O'Connor, in dissent, attempted the Ge lpcke/Smith maneuver of
refusi ng retroactive effect to decisions believed wrong and argu ed th at althoug h Bacchus Imports Ltd
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), had app li ed its rule to the parti es before the Court, stare decisis did not
co mpel her to retroactive application of the mlc in Beam. Se e id. at 550-52 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). With in the decision-time n:odel. this move is legitimate. Because the decision-time
res ult in Scheiner chan ges the law only after th at deci sion, the tax at iss ue in Smith was co nstitutional
until Scheiner was handed down. Justice O' Conn or. however, is a consistent proponent of th e
transaction-time model. On th is mode of anal ys is. the eark:r decision-t ime result in Bacchus asserts
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Justices Scalia, Marshall, and Blackmun, advocated the decision-time
model.
With the resignation of Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia lost a staunch,
if unlikely, decision-time ally. The latest changes in the Court have removed two more, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, 272 and while the new
additions have supported decision-time results, the decision-time model
seems again on the wane. The most recent cases, Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation 273 and Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 274 have
reached decision-time results but have done so, like James Beam, within a
transaction-time model. Both cases framed the question as one of "retroactive effect," and both held that application of a new rule in the case announcing it implies that the rule is retroactive. 275 Only Justice Scalia, concurring in Harper, argued for the decision-time model. 276
Like the Warren Court, the current Court tends towards the transaction-time model. Unlike its predecessor, however, it does so with an
awareness of the model's limitations, disavowing the incoherence of selective prospectivity. Pure prospectivity, though still mentioned as permissible, seems unlikely to reemerge. Not only does a strong majority
seem to favor decision-time results, but even the prospectivity proponents
are reluctant not to apply a new rule in the case announcing it, because of
the advisory opinion problem. 277 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the
champions of prospectivity, thus find themselves in an unenviable double
bind. Avoiding advisory opinions requires them to urge retroactive application in the first case, but once this has been granted, the consistent majority opposition to selective prospectivity requires retroactive application
thereafter. In terms of reaching transaction-time results via prospectivity,
their tools are not equal to their task.
A glance at the academic reviews of the Court's performance reveals
that it is not a hit. 278 The lukewarm reception is justified; the caselaw is an
uninspiring hodgepodge of two- and three-Justice opinions. It could be
much better, and employing the decision-time model would make it so, as

not only what the law is, but what it was at the time of the transaction. Its stare decisis effect, then,
extends retroactively all the way back to the transaction.
272. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun were late converts to the decision-time model.
Until United States v. Johnson, 457 US. 53 7 (1982), both Justices had taken positions inconsistent
with Justice Harlan's approach on direct review. See, eg, Williams v United States, 401 U.S 646
(1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S 244 (1969).
273. 509 U.S. 86 ( 1993)
274. 514 U.S 749 (1995).
275. See Harper, 509 U.S at 90; Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 753.
276 . See Harper, 509 U.S. at 102-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
277. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 US. 656. 689-90 ( 1987) (O'Connor, J, concurring).
278. See sources cited supra notes 166-67.
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the following section demonstrates .
4.

Using the Decision-Time Model

a. Criminal Procedure
Within the decision-time model , the concept of retroactivity has no
role to play. The result of adopting this model in the criminal procedure
context would thus be the application of new rules to all cases on direct
review, consistent with the traditional judicial duty to resolv e cases according to th e best current understanding of the law. 279 Cases on collateral
review, by contrast, would be analyzed according to the law prevailing at
the time of the original trial. The decision-time model thus produces results very similar to th ose of the current Griffith/Teague regime, with substantiall y greater doctrin al coherence.
Prospective results would be reached through the law of remedi es .
T he remedi al flexibility of reviewing courts in the area of criminal procedure is not entirely cl ear, and a pre- Warren Court might have been justifiably hesitant to rely on the law of remedies to mitigate the disrupti ve
effect of new constitutional rules. Until the 1960s, it was generally assu med "that co nstituti onal violations could never be regarded as harml ess
error.'' 280 The ability to reach tran saction-time resu lts on direct review of
cr iminal appeals was thus severely constrained in precisely the area of the
Court's great crimina l procedure innovations. However, in part perh aps
because of those innovations, th e Warren Court also reworked the harmless error doctrine. In 1963, four Justices in Fahy v. ConnecticuP 81 had
indicated a di sposition to hold that erroneous admission of unconstitutiona lly obtained ev idence co uld be deemed harmless on appeal. Four yea rs
later, Chapman v. California 282 explicitly recognized the possi bility of
harmless co nstitutional error.
Both Fah_v and Chapman are, from one perspective, retroactivity
cases, in that the " errors" in both were produced by decisions intervenin g
between tri a l a nd appellate rev iew .283 Neither, however, features an explicit di sc uss ion of retroactivity; the effect of the rule is determined entirely by remedial doctrines. Harml ess error ana lysis, of cou rse, is not
ent ire ly sat isfactory in that it makes no inquiry into the purpose of the rul e.
279. See generally Note. supra note 225 (urging the applicati on of dec ision-time law and the usc of
reme dial tl ex ibility in the limited co ntext of exclus ionary rule decis ions on direct review).
280. Y ALE KAMISAR ET AL, M ODE RN CRIMI NAL PROC EDURE 1605 (8 th ed. 1994).
28 I. 3 75 U.S. 85 ( 1963) .
282. 386 U.S. 18 ( 1967).
283 Interven in g in Chapman was Grijjin v. Californ ia, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965), wh ich held
unconstitutional pwsccutorial co mment on a defendant's failure to tes tify. Mapp v. Ohio . 367 U.S .
643 ( 1961 ), the case at issue in Linkleller, intervened between trial and appellate revi ew in Fahy
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It is thus at best a somewhat unprincipled stop-gap measure.
A purpose-based analysis would have a reach both broader and more
discerning. Where the purpose of a new rule is deterrent, as the Court's
Fourth Amendment innovations have been, an individual defendant has
little grounds on which to complain if the exclusionary remedy is withheld
in his case. Given that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy
rather than a substantive individual right, reviewing courts should have
some latitude in withholding it where new rules are at issue. Rules creating procedural rights that do belong to defendants, rather than to society,
would by contrast demand remedies on direct review. 284
The danger posed by a purpose-based analysis is that a predictable
remedial regime under which, for example, the exclusionary remedy was
withheld for new Fourth Amendment rules, would give litigants little incentive to raise novel claims. The result might be a dramatic decrease in
the pace of constitutional change. Selective prospectivity-rewarding
only the litigant in whose case a new rule is announced-has been suggested as the best way to preserve litigant incentives while minimizing the
disruption of state criminal justice systems.285
Selective prospectivity, however, is impossible to reconcile with
courts' commitment to do justice to litigants on the merits of their individual cases. Nor, [think , is it really necessary to prevent constitutional ossification. A purpose-based inquiry, recall , would withhold a remedy only
where the new rule is a clear break with existing doctrine. If the new rule
has any basis in constitutional law, it can presumably also be reached incrementally. Finally, the concern about litigants' incentives is minimized
by any remedial calculus that is not perfectly predictable. Since no clear
line exists between incremental changes in law and rules so new that their
enforcement would serve no deterrent purpose, the result of a purposebased inquiry should seldom be foreordained. Moreover, the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment deters questionable police conduct is a
function of how willing courts are to apply new rules. The degree of deterrence desired is a fact-sensitive question that could well be influenced
by the circumstances of an individual case. If uncertainty as to whether a
remedy w ill be granted exists, and if arguments can be made on either
side, I itigants can be expected to press novel claim s as vigorously as ever.
A purpose-based remedial inquiry, used within the deci s ion-time
model, would allow courts to do justice to litigants on the merits of their
claims . It would permit prospective application of some new rules with out
234. An example of this so rt of ri ght is the ri ght to co unsel reco gnized by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 33 5 (1 963)
285. Se!' , e.g., Fall on & Meltzer. supra note 42, at 1811-12.
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selectively warping the substantive law around lucky individuals, and it
would preserve litigants' incentives to pursue novel claims . While the
post-Griffith Court seems to have little interest in reaching prospective
results in criminal cases on direct review, the possibility exists.
b. Statutes of Limitations
Decisions applying new statutes of limitations offer one of the clearer
cases for purpose-based analysis . Lampj, for example , featured a situation
in which lower courts had regularly borrowed state statutes of limitations
to govern the federal right of action implied under Rule 1Ob-5. The Court
decided that a uniform federal statute of limitations would better serve
justice by promoting uniformity and predictability. 286 This reasoning is
quite convincing; what is harder to see is how the purposes of uniformity
and predictability are served by applying the new federal statute of limitations to cases pending on direct review. The Larnpj Court notably passed
over this issue without discussion , provoking both a sharp dissent and an
unsuccessful attempt by Congress to undo the inequitable results.
The decision-time model, which the Lampj Court adopted, in no way
compels this decision-time result. The doctrine of equitable tolling is
regularly applied to protect parties whose claims have lapsed through no
fault of their own, 287 and could easily have been applied in Lampj 288 But
Lampfs rejection of equitable tolling was echoed by Reynoldsville Casket.
That case featured an Ohio state tolling statute that " in effect, gav e Ohio
tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) defendants. "289 The Court held the statute unco nstitutional in Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. lvfidwesco Enterprises, Inc. / 90 and the question in Reynoldsville
Casket was the retroactive effect of Bendix. Because the Bendix Court had
applied its rule to the parties before it, Harper demanded that it be applied
also to the Reynoldsville Casket plaintiff.

286. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind . Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson , 50 I U.S 350. 35 7 ( 1991)
287. Usually. equitable tolling is invoked where the injury has not bc<: n di scove red. It is but a
small stretch to ap ply this to situations in which the injured party has relied on authoritative judicial
statements of a statute of limitations.
28 8. The Lampf plaintiffs raised the eq uitable tolling argument, and th e Court rejected it, based on
what it termed ''the inescapable co nclusion that Co ngress did not intend equi tabl e to ilin g to apply in
acti ons under the securities laws." Lampf, 50 I U.S. at 363. This may well be correct as a matter of
congressional inten t with res pect to sec uriti es actions ge nerall y. The result of its applicati on in
Lamp}; h owev~ r . was so disturbing to Co ngress that it enacted on ly partl y constitutional legi slation in
an only partly succ ess ful attempt to reverse the dec isi on. See Pl au t v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 5 14 US.
2 11 , 225 (1995} (concluding th at th e leg islation violated the se paratio n of powe rs because it
instructed federal co urts to reopen fin al judgments) . Given the co ngre ss ional res ponse, equitab le
tolling see ms fairly co nso nant with what Congress would have intende d on th e facts of Lampj
289 . Rey noldsville Casket Co . v. Hyde, 514 U.S . 749,750 (1995)
290. 486 U.S 888, 894-95 (1988).
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The plaintiff tried to avoid this result by arguing that the Ohio courts
might continue to toll the statute of limitation s "as a state law 'equitable'
device. " 291 The Court rejected the invitation, stating that "we do not see
how ... the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that fed eral law, applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate
simply by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a
remedy. " 292 The significance of Reynoldsville Casket is not entirely clear.
Given that it relied on the application of Bendix to the Bendix parties, it is
still possible to maintain that a court may consider equitable factors in
granting remedies in the first case applying a new rule and be co ns istent
thereafter. Thus Reynoldsville Casket may merely extend to remedies th e
Beam Court's statement that "the substantive law will not shift and
spring": 93 on the basis of individual equities .294
On this reading, the Court demanded no more than cons istency with
Bendix, 295 and Bendix is intelligible on a purpose-based remedial analys is .
The Ohio tolling provision at issue in Bendix and Reynoldsville Casket
was struck down not in order to promote uniformi ty and predictability, but
rather to prevent discrimination against out-of-state defendants. The purpose of preventing discrimination was quite clearly served by reachin g a
dec ision-time result, and it might even have req uired th e Co urt to reject an
attempt by the Ohio court to invoke equ itable tollin g.296 Use of equitable
tolling to reach prospective results in cases applyin g new statutes of limitations is consistent with the decision-time model , the Court' s precedents,
and considerations of substantive justice .
c. Tax Refunds
Cases seeking refunds of unconstitutionall y collected taxes provide
perhaps the most tempting case for the transaction-time model. Where the
conduct complained of is ongoing, as is the case with tax collection, th e
transaction-time model allows for purely prospective relief without facing
th e advisory opinion problem. This approach, however, would come into
291 Reynoldsv ille Casket, 514 U S. at 753 .
292. lei
293. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Geo rgia, 50 1 U.S. 529,543 (1991)
294. What makes this readin g of Reynoldsville Casket a littl e difficult is the statement th at fede ral
law, i.e., th e un constitution ality of the tolling statute. di ctates th e r~s ult. It is not clear why th e
remed ial inquiry is no t a state law questi on: why the Ohi o courts could not equi tab ly toll th e
otherwise ap pli cable Ohi o statute of limitati ons as a matter of state rem edi al law. The Reynoldsville
Casket opinion sugges ts that remedial di screti on cann ot be us ed to reach transaction-time resu lts. and
th us seems to abandon Beam ' s di stinction between the " rem edi al" an d the "cho ice-o f-l aw" in quiri es.
295. The retroactivity issue in Bendix was raised for the first time on appeal, and the Court refused
to co nsider it. Appare ntl y as a conse quen ce. it app lied the decis ion retroacti ve ly.
296 . Thi s issue was not clearly prese nted, as the Ohio cou rt character ized its dispos iti on as refu sing
retroactive effect. See Hyde v. Reyn oldsville Casket Co .. 626 N.E.2d 75.77 (Ohio 1994) .
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immediate conflict with Griffith. 297 If a state pursued both a civil and a
criminal action against resisting taxpayers and both cases reached the
Court on direct review, a civil holding of non-retroactivity, coupled with
Gr!ffith's required criminal retroactivity, would produce conflicting statements about the constitutionality of the tax.
This conflict could be avoided if Griffith's decision-time results were
reached within a decision-time model, 298 and consistency could be produced by a regime that called for the transaction-time model in civil cases
but the decision-time model in criminal ones. This dichotomy, at the level
of result, was urged by Justice O'Connor in Smith/ 99 and rejected over her
dissent in Harper. 300 The distinction is no easier to justify in terms of conceptual models. Although distinguishing between criminal and civil cases
would allow the Court somewhat greater freedom in civil cases featuring
ongoing conduct, it is too unprincipled to be very attractive.
Although it is ultimately undesirable, the transaction-time model is
made more appealing by the difficulty in reaching prospective results via
remedial analysis in tax refund cases . The costs to states of refunding unconstitutional taxes can be immense, and courts may understandably want
to avoid imposing crushing refund liability. 301 Of course, a mere finding of
unconstitutionality does not mandate refunds. In some circumstances,
taxes may be retroactively altered by the state to render them constitutional ; this is often the case with taxes that violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause.302 Additionally, the availability
of a predeprivation hearing may allow states to avoid refunds. 303 The
qu estion is whether prospective results may be reached where no predeprivation hearing was available and no retroactive reformation is possible.
Th e purpose-oriented analysis suggests not; since the reasons behind the
unconstituti onality of a tax will ordinarily be applicable to the individual
taxpayers, it seems that no remedial adjustment should be made .
In support of this position, it might be argued that states that unconstitutionally collect taxes without affording taxpayers an opportunity to

297 . Thi s point and a more extended exposition of the foll owin g example have bee n ni ce ly made
by Fallon and Meltzer. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42, at 1767-68.
293. On the dec ision-rime model, th e constituti onality of the tax in th e past would not affect th e
result on direc t review . Nor would it on collateral revi ew, sin ce a decision-time court would grant a
habeas petiti on to a person impri so ned for co nstituti onall y protected co ndu ct. If the prospective
decision was not co nstitutionally grounded, a habeas petitioner wou ld get no relie( but thi s result is
not in consistent with prospective invalidati on.
299 . See American Trucking Ass' ns v. Smith , 496 U.S. 167, 197-99 (1990).
30 0. See Harper v. Virginia Dep ' t ofTaxati on, 509 U.S 86,97 ( 1993).
30 I. See id at 129 -30 (O'Connor, J ., disse nting).
302. See id at I 00-0 I.
303 . See id
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challenge their legitimacy deserve no special solicitude. This argument
may be too strong, since an unpredictable Supreme Court decision has the
potential to inflict massive liability on a state acting in good faith. The
problem, however, is a result of the anomalous treatment of tax refund
suits, rather than a retroactivity issue.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally frees states from the
obligation to pay compensatory damage s for past injuries. The normative
rationale for the different treatment of tax refunds is hard to uncover, especially since it seems to favor prope11y over life and liberty in the constitutional calculus. 304 Regardless of the explanation, the solution to the
problem of state liability for unconstitutionally collected taxes should be
sought in immunity doctrines rather than by a deformation of retroactivity
jurisprudence. 305 It might be reasonable, for example, for the Court to create a qualified immunity to tax refund suits similar to that enjoyed by state
officials against Section 1983 damages actions for constitutional violations.306

IV. CONCLUS ION
The formulation of a theoretically justifiable approach to retroactivity
must start with a reformation of the underlying conceptual framework.
The Warren Court' s adoption of the transaction-time model marked an
unfortunate turn into doctrinal confusion and incoherence; the current
Court has undertaken repairs at the level of result and has consequently

304. The positive rationale is on ly somewhat clearer. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17. 24
(1920), rests its refund requirement on the principle that "mo ney go t through imposi tion may be
recove red back," and derives thi s principl e in turn from the Takings Cla use. The Takings Clause
cann ot be the whole story, however, since no refund of an unconstitutional tax is required if the state
provides an opportunity for a predeprivation hearing. See McKesso n Corp. v. Divis io n of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36 -3 7 ( 1990). Monies collected under an unconstitutional tax
would sti ll seem to be private property taken for public use, and the Takings C lause makes no
exception for tak in gs wi th due process . Where no predeprivation hearing is avai lable, the refund
requirement is currently characterized as tlowing from the Due Process Clause . See id. at 31.
305 . Interestingl y, Scheiner offered the possibility of pure prospectivity by remand to the state
co urt for resolution of th e retroactivity question. See Americ an Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S.
266, 297-98 (1987) . State co urts are often not prohibited from iss uing advisory opini ons and might
favor state tax authorities over out-of-state plaintiffs. On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
for ex ample, held the Scheiner decision purel y pros pective. See American Trucking Ass' ns v.
McNulty , 596 A.2d 784 , 790 (Pa. 199 1). Huwever. the retroactivity of a dete rminati on of
unconstitutionality is a federal questi on, as th e Smith Court held . See American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smi th, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990). The ability of a state co urt on reman d to adjust remedi es to blunt
the effect of a federal holding of retroactivity has been cast in seri ous doubt by Reynoldsville Casket.
306. This would require a chang"! in Takings Cla use jurispruden ce, since First Eng lish £,•angelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S 304, 316 n.9 ( 1987 ), reje cted the argume nt that
sovereign immunity can bar a mon etary reme dy under the Just Compensation Cl aus e.
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been only partially successful. The decision-time model , advocated by
Justice Harlan and displayed in the pre-Warren Courtjurisprudence, would
allow the Court to reach its currently preferred results with greater theoretical consistency.
Choice of analytical model does not determine results. While adoption of the decision-time model would bring a theoretical coherence, it
would not uniformly require decision-time results . The existing doctrines
of remedial discreti on, including harmless error and equitable tolling,
would allow courts to reach just results in the cases before them without
deforming retroactivity jurisprudence to suit remedial preferences. In areas where remedial discretion does not provide sufficient flexibility, as
may be the case with tax refund suits, the answer must be sought in the
substantive law of those particular areas.
Most importantly, the dec ision-time model makes the distinction between direct and collateral review that has been so elusive. Abandoning
the transaction-time model will free the Court from the impossible task of
trying to justify results that cannot be justified within its theoretical
framework; it will solve the problem of retroactivity. On this foundation ,
a coherent jurisprudence may be built.

